

**2007 POST ELECTION VIOLENCE AND THE RESPONSE OF SEVENTH- DAY  
ADVENTIST CHURCH: A CASE STUDY OF ELDORET EAST DISTRICT, KENYA**

**BY**

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## DECLARATION

### STUDENT'S DECLARATION

I, **Ogaro Davis Nyaoko**, declare that this dissertation entitled "**2007 Post Election Violence and the Response of Seventh- Day Adventist Church: a case study of Eldoret East District, Kenya** " is my original work and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete reference and that it has never been submitted to Kyambogo University or any other institution of higher learning for any academic credit whatsoever.


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## **SUPERVISOR'S APPROVAL**

I confirm that the work reported in this dissertation was carried out by the candidate under my supervision.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this dissertation to my dear sons, Simeon Areri Ogaro and Gideon Onentia Ogaro whose support is paramount to my success. You are a blessing to the world and that makes me proud. God bless you.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

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## ABSTRACT

This study sought to discuss the 2007 post election violence and the response of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Eldoret East district. Political factors, inequitable resource allocation, land issues, prejudice, failure of the Police, communal conflicts, hate speeches, the media, tribalism and discrimination were discussed as the causes of the 2007 PEV. Mass loss of life, displacement of persons, destruction of property, fear of fresh ethnic clashes, injuries, fluctuation of the economy, food shortage, alteration of land tenure system, sexual based violence, effects on schools, health related problems and environmental consequences were discussed as the negative effects of the 2007 PEV. After the 2007 PEV, the study indicated that Kenyans have cherished the spirit of development, co-existence, peace, unity, and reconciliation more than ever before. This led to the formation and implementation of the new constitution that provides equal opportunity for all citizens regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. Consequently, the Kenyan people demonstrated solidarity by conducting peaceful general elections in 2013. The SDA Church responded to the 2007 PEV by preaching love, peace and solidarity, providing food and non-food items, offering prayers and counseling services, negotiating between warring communities, visiting the clash victims, and rushing the injured to the hospital. Churches were used both as hiding places and shelters for the affected persons.

However, the Church was also used by politicians to utter hate speeches, propagate tribalism and discrimination. The study was descriptive in nature and adopted qualitative research approach. Purposive sampling was applied to the subjects the researcher believed had relevant information on the problem under investigation. Interview, questionnaire, and observation were the main tools for data collection.

*Key Words:* Ethnic Violence, Election, Response

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATION**

<b>ADRA</b>	:	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
<b>AIC</b>	:	African Inland Church
<b>CIPEV</b>	:	Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence
<b>ECK</b>	:	Electoral Commission of Kenya
<b>ICC</b>	:	International Criminal Court
<b>IDP</b>	:	Internally Displaced person
<b>NCCK</b>	:	National Council of Churches of Kenya
<b>NGO</b>	:	Non Governmental Organization
<b>PCEA</b>	:	Presbyterian Church of East Africa
<b>PEV</b>	:	Post Election Violence
<b>R2P</b>	:	Responsibility to Protect
<b>S.D.A</b>	:	Seventh Day Adventist
<b>TJRC</b>	:	Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission
<b>UN</b>	:	United Nations
<b>OHCHR</b>	:	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>SGBV</b>	:	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
<b>KANU</b>	:	Kenya African National Union was the ruling party in Kenya from 1963-2002.
<b>NARC</b>	:	National Rainbow Coalition was the multi-tribal coalition of all tribes formed to defeat the KANU in the 2002 general election.
<b>ODM</b>	:	Orange Democratic Movement, which Odinga ran under in 2007 elections

and comprised of a multi-tribal alliance.

**PNU** : Party National Unity, which President Kibaki ran under in the 2007  
Elections and comprised mainly of Kikuyus.

**MOU** : Memorandum of Understanding; an agreement which was to form power-  
sharing type of government in 2002 in Kenya.

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of the Study

This study attempted to discuss the 2007 post election violence and the response of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Eldoret East district in Kenya. Eldoret East district is one of districts in the Rift Valley province of Kenya. Its neighboring districts include: Trans Nzoia to the north, Wareng to the south, Keiyo to the east, and Soy to the west. As Karanja and Mwasi (2009) inform, this area is densely populated due to conducive climatic conditions for practicing agriculture. While it's historically believed that the native occupants of this area were the Kalenjins and the Maasai, the Human Rights Watch (November, 1993) notes that there are many different people today from other ethnic groups in Kenya living and working in Eldoret East district. For example, both the Kikuyu and the Abagusii people are involved in businesses as well as practicing agriculture. However, there had been lack of peaceful coexistence among these ethnic communities for a long time.

Kenya was left with deep scars by the violence that erupted in the aftermath of the disputed Presidential election of 27 December 2007. In just a matter of weeks, Kenya was transformed from one of Africa's most stable democracies into chaos. Political and ethnic violence left more than a thousand people dead and over 350,000 people were forced to flee their homes as violence and machete-wielding gangs roamed the streets (Amnesty International USA, 2008; CIPEV, 2008). A coalition government headed by the former president Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga –the two candidates claiming that each had won the presidential election- was agreed three months after the disputed elections. With the coalition agreement the post election violence ceased, but the underlying triggers, extent and consequences of electoral violence in Kenya have still to be fully addressed.

The majority of studies of conflict have tended to focus on cross-country comparisons, or in the case of country studies, to gather scant evidence, often anecdotal, which limits the understanding of what are the risk factors for violence. This study aimed at assessing the Seventh-day Adventist Church's response in dealing with the conflict since it was part of community where the conflicts occurred (Collier and Vicente, 2008; Kalvas, 2008; Barron et al., 2009; Bellows and Miguel, 2009) by assessing the individual and local factors that increased the risk of being a victim of electoral violence. The ordeal of the disputed election reduced trust across ethnic groups, a key element of social capital among communities. International experience has shown that in situations where (ethnic) groups distrust each other and are afraid of being victimized, this fear might drive them to resort to violence first in a preemptive move to minimize damage (Bardhan, 1997). Taking into account that having experienced conflict in the recent past is a good predictor for future conflict (Collier et al. 2008), Kenya is at risk of experiencing violence in the forthcoming 2017 general elections if institutions are not strengthened to cope with the underlying grievances, the need for justice and the mistrust among ethnic groups.

This study therefore was meant to provide empirical evidence to confirm the causes and effects of 2007 PEV, as well as the Seventh-Day Adventist Church's response to this scourge in Eldoret East district.

According to the report by Independent Review Commission (December, 2007), Eldoret East district was characterized by bloodshed, tension, insecurity, destruction of life and property, and forced migration. It has experienced recurrence of tension since 1992 when multiparty politics was inaugurated in Kenya and during the general elections of 1997, and 2007. For all these years, the people of Eldoret East district have suffered from ethnic clashes which have

affected the economy of the country. During the 2007 PEV in Eldoret East, various sectors were negatively affected. For instance, the water sector was affected in four main areas namely; operations, equipment, physical facilities and staff. There was a big challenge of providing water for internally displaced persons

The 2007 Post election violence in Eldoret East was a major concern to the government due to the havoc caused not only in the political sphere, but also the economic, social sectors, psychological and religious dimensions. It was generally believed that the Christian faith's mission in Eldoret East district was to promote peace and unity among the people. Similarly, the Seventh-day Adventist church was among the many that were affected during the same period. This situation raised concerns in relation to how the Seventh-day Adventist Church responded to the 2007 PEV in Eldoret East district.

## **1.2 The Statement of the Problem**

Immediately after the announcement of the Presidential election results of 2007 in Kenya, violence erupted almost simultaneously in a number of different locations such as Eldoret East, Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and other urban centers. Eldoret East district being a cosmopolitan society with many different ethnic groups, such as Kalenjins, Abagusii, Massai, Kikuyu and the Luhya and the fighting was fierce. The groups aforementioned have a common quest for land to practice agricultural activities. There is always tension, fear and much insecurity especially when time for general elections approach. As a result people were displaced and many more killed as a result of post-election violence. Throughout the conflict, the international community focused intensely on the violence in Kenya. A United Nations peace mission headed by former UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, backed by the influential community of aid donors, agitated for putting a halt to the violence and attempted to promote negotiations between government- and opposition leaders.

The Seventh-day Adventist Church finds itself at the heart of these ethnic conflicts. It has experienced the different ethnic violence over the years. Specifically, in 2007 post-election violence it was in the heart of everything as there were members from different ethnic backgrounds who worship in their churches as well needing a way to help those in need. It is on this note that the researcher intended to analyze how the Seventh-day Adventist Church response to the 2007 PEV in Eldoret East district.

### **1.3. Research Question**

How did the Seventh-day Adventist Church respond to the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district?

### **1.4. Objectives of the Study**

This section handled both the general and the specific objectives of the study.

#### **1.4.1. General Objective**

The general aim of the study was to examine the 2007 post election violence and the response of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Eldoret East district, Kenya.

#### **1.4.2. Specific Objectives**

1. To critically describe the 2007 post election violence.
2. To find out the causes and effects of 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East.
3. To discuss the response of the Seventh-day Adventist Church to 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district.

### **1.5. Scope of the Study**

The study analyzed the 2007 post election violence and the response of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Eldoret East district. Eldoret East district is in the Rift Valley province, and 313 km west of Nairobi the capital city of Kenya.

Like any other war, the 2007 post election violence in Kenya had far reaching consequences that would continue being felt even after 1000 years because it shaped many people's lives, but the study specifically focused on the response of the Seventh-day Adventist Church covering the period between December 2007 and March 2013 when a peaceful general election in Kenya was conducted.

### **1.6. Significance of the Study**

The findings of the study can enable both the religious and community leaders to curb ethnic clashes like the ones of 2007 in Eldoret East district and other confronted areas in Kenya.

The government policy makers and donor agencies can use the knowledge acquired from the study to formulate policies which can suggest a permanent solution to ethnic clashes in Eldoret East district and other affected parts of the country.

Christian Churches can benefit from the findings of the study so much that they can use the knowledge gained to promote peace and unity not only amongst the people of Eldoret East district, but also Kenya as a whole.

The findings of the study can furnish other scholars with reliable information on the ethnic clashes and peace building.

The police force and the Ministry of Internal Security can benefit extensively from the findings of the study. This can enable them find logistics of preventing clashes to take place.

They also won't find it necessary to deploy heavy security in the process of curbing social disorders especially during ethnic clashes.

Investors, such as business men and women and farmers can profoundly benefit from the findings of the study. The knowledge they gain from this study can enable them to promote peace as they settle and invest much more confidently in Eldoret East district than before.

The civil society can benefit to a large extent from the findings of the study. They can use the knowledge to live happily with their families and neighbors without being involved in destroying either life or property. In this case, everyone can appreciate one another without discrimination and by so doing; this can promote peace and unity among the people of Kenya.

On understanding the causes and effects of ethnic clashes in Eldoret East district, the politicians from this affected area can use the knowledge gained from this study to promote peace and unity in their various parliamentary constituencies and the whole of Kenya.

Non-Governmental Organizations can use the research findings as peace builders, to promote peace among the people of Eldoret East district and the entire nation of Kenya.

The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission of Kenya (IEBC) can gain knowledge from this study to enhance management of poll without committing the same mistakes as ECK.

### **1.7. Definition of Terms**

**Ethnic:** A tribal group that has a common cultural tradition.

**Clash:** Fight or violent contact between two ethnic communities or several communities.

**Seventh Day Adventist Church:** It is a Christian denomination that keeps Saturday as a Religious holiday and believes in the second coming of Jesus Christ.

**Response:** A reaction to a given situation by trying to provide way of overcoming a challenge or concern.

**Resolution:** Decision or mental pledge to do or not to do something.

**Hegemony:** Leadership especially by one state in a group of states.

**Ameliorate:** Cause something to become better.

**Political:** Affairs that pertain to the government or the public in general.

**Refugees:** A person who has been forced to leave his/her home and seek refuge.

**Displaced person:** A person who is moved from his/her usual or correct place.

**District:** Many Churches under the leadership of a pastor/ parish

**Election:** Ballot vote

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1. Introduction

This section contained a review of literature about the problem that was investigated. Various literatures by scholars, authors, presentations and researchers were reviewed in order to provide in-depth information about the analysis of the 2007 post election violence and aspects of ethnic clashes in relation to the causes and the effects.

#### 2.2. The course of the 2007 Post Election Violence

This section handled a critical description of the 2007 post election violence according to various sources. Historically, Kenya was ruled by the iron hands of two men in succession from 1963 to 2002: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi (1978-2002) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the ruling political party. KANU's dominance was achieved by banning opposition parties in 1969 leaving Kenya a *de facto* one-party State to a *de jure* one-party State when a constitutional amendment in 1978 ruled that no other party was able to contest in the elections (Gutierrez-Romero, 2008). Upon Kenyatta's death in 1978, Moi (from the Kalenjin tribe) assumed the presidency through his constitutional right as Vice President, and was able to take advantage of the vast infrastructure of executive power Kenyatta had created. This was especially seen by Moi's ability to abolish the multiparty system through an amendment to the constitution in 1982, effectively making him head of both the executive branch and Parliament (Mutua, 2008). With the above background, the study sought to investigate the connection between the old regime (KANU) and the new one (PNU) vis-à-vis the eruption of the 2007 post election violence in Kenya.

After much pressure from Kenyan activists and the International Community in 1991, multi-party elections were re-introduced (Markussen July, 2011). Kwanja (2003) observed that several opposition parties emerged (Ford Kenya, Ford Asili, Democratic Party of Kenya, National Development of Kenya, Social Democratic Party, and other smaller parties). Nonetheless, KANU remained in power winning the general elections of 1992 and 1997 amid violence and allegations of electoral irregularities. Much of the violence occurred during the pre-elections period and was concentrated in the Rift Valley and Western provinces and apparent local 'Kalenjin warriors' attacked the homes and farms of migrant non-Kalenjin groups. Even when the multiparty system reemerged in 1991, Moi was able to use his position to limit the opposition through intimidation as well as create votes through voting fraud in the elections of 1992 and 1997. In relation to the above, the study was interested in how ethicized politics influenced the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district.

KANU collapsed in 2002 according to Mara (September, 2009). It collapsed beneath a new political party comprised of an alliance that had formed between all of the major Kenyan tribes. This political stakeholder was named the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Within NARC, the following agreements had been reached as conditions for appointing Kibaki as a presidential candidate for the 2002 election (Daily Nation, October 23rd, 2002): (1) divide the cabinet posts equally between the Democratic Party (DP) group which was led by Kibaki and the other group which was led by Odinga, (2) set up a new constitution and devolve to Prime Minister part of the authority that the president held under the existing constitution, and (3) support Mr. Odinga to be elected as the Prime Minister. The election victory was a landslide. Mwai Kibaki of the NARC won 62% of the vote on a platform of fighting corruption, forming a coalition government that shared power amongst the various tribes, and changing the constitution within 100 days of being elected to limit the executive power that

had ballooned over the previous four decades (Mutua, 2008; Calas, 2008). Most people felt hope that the country's government was finally on the verge of a system of governance that would have accountability through shared power (Mara, 2009; Takashi, et al. September, 2010).

In connection to the above, as the new government was formed, the process of cabinet formation and constitutional reform faced constant delay, and the relationship between the camps under NARC started to fall apart. This left many citizens tasting what could have been and frustrated over what should have resulted from the new government to power in 2002 (Mara, 2009). The existing constitution then, which had been written at the time of independence from the British, gave the Kenyan president significant power initially designed to overcome obstacles for the newly created country. During the presidential campaign for the 2002 election, NARC pleaded to devolve certain presidential power to other posts and regional governments as already mentioned. However, the "new" constitution proposal, which was drafted under a close supervision of the newly elected president Kibaki, failed to devolve much of the presidential power. The draft was eventually vetoed by the disillusioned public in the referendum of 2005, greatly undermining public support for President Kibaki. Meanwhile, Odinga newly formed a political force namely the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) which was an opposition party. ODM continued to gain support throughout the country by setting up the Pentagon or a political partnership among regional politicians from not only Nyanza Province where Odinga comes from but also from the Western, Rift Valley, Eastern, and Coastal Provinces. The significance of this partnership was that ODM was given a national outlook (Markussen, July, 2011). While the above claims seemed to be true, the study unearthed the relevance of political completion to the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district.

In the 2007 general election, most Kenyans invested their faith in the electoral process. As Murunga (2011) noted, Kenyans not only expected a transparent process and outcome, but also assumed the incumbent would, at the very least, respect their choice. According to Independent Review Commission (2008) on the general election that was chaired by a former South African appeal court judge, Johann Kriegler, Kenyans registered to vote in vast numbers, braved long queues, the hot sun or rainy conditions, and cast their votes in a relatively peaceful process. The study intended to critically describe the 2007 post election violence and its implications on the people of Eldoret East district and the Kenyan nation.

During the political campaigns, two major parties contested during 2007 general elections. The ODM had a strong institutional framework known as the “Pentagon”- in the persons of Henry Kosgey and William Ruto from Rift Valley, Musalia Mudavadi from Western, Joseph Nyagah from Central, Najib Balala from the Coast, and later Charity Ngilu from Eastern and representing women’s interests. ODM and its presidential candidate had more or less locked up most regional votes. The ODM “Pentagon” aimed at power-sharing arrangement across the provinces, as well as redistribution of resources, equitable development and resolution of the constitutional stalemate (Macarthur, 2008). Musalia Mudavadi was Odinga’s viable running mate, with Rift Valley’s William Ruto expected to become the Prime Minister in the ODM government. Equally disaffected were voters in Coast Province, a rich region which had been fully exploited by upcountry people at the expense of the coastal people who now had the chance to vote out an unpopular, untrustworthy government which had perpetuated longstanding marginalization of this potentially rich region. With Nyanza province’s longstanding disaffection with previous governments and Rift Valley province opposing Kibaki for ungratefulness to the region, after Moi an alliance between them was to be

expected. Most unexpected, however, was Western province, with a former short-lived Vice President - Musalia Mudavadi - becoming part of a formidable opposition.

In the run-up to the 2007 elections, both ODM and PNU subtly appealed to ethnic identity and ethnic prejudice. Opinion polls taken before elections reveal strong correlations between ethnicity and voting intentions (Kimenyi and Gutierrez-Romero, 2008). The message of change propagated by ODM made the young voters hopeful that things might just be different next time around. In relation to the above, the researcher felt that there was political competition between the two major parties. He endeavored to critically describe the significance of the purported political hope as demonstrated by ODM and related to the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district.

After the elections and especially once the results were released, the opposition party supporters went on an unprecedented level of 'orgy of violence' which led to counter attacks and 'revenge killings' (Otieno, 2009; The Standard, 2009). With regard to commencement of the clashes, Steven (December, 2008), noted that the 2007 post-election violence occurred over the course of the following month, with certain periods of intense violence. The United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Mission to Kenya (February 2008) notes roughly 3 periods of heightened conflict: immediately after the elections, mid – January (16<sup>th</sup> -18<sup>th</sup>) and during the last week of the month. The initial wave of evidence occurred in the form of riots and demonstrations, and was primarily a reaction from angry ODM supporters who felt the election was stolen from them and stormed the streets in large crowds. Seeing the reaction of the public, the Kibaki government placed a blanket ban on all public demonstrations which was actually illegal according to the law, but justified it as necessary means to prevent further violence and chaos. However, the requirement of a heavy

police presence resulted in numerous deadly clashes between police and crowds. Though Kenyan police were sent to disperse rioters, some reports indicated that they targeted specifically opposition supporters and assisted pro-government gangs (Markussen, July 2011). The study was out to investigate the above mentioned claims.

As discussed above, the violence went on and became more targeted, deliberate and ethicized (United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Mission to Kenya, February 2008). Primarily, Kikuyu communities seen to be supportive of Kibaki were driven from their homes and killed. The final wave of violence occurred at the end of January as a Kikuyu retaliation for the first attacks. Against the predictions of opinion polls and the early counts of the votes, the Election Commission of Kenya found Mwai Kibaki the winner of the presidential election on 30 December, placing him ahead of Odinga by 232,000 votes. The result contradicted the parliamentary election that was conducted at the same time as Odinga's ODM won against President Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) by a large margin as already mentioned. Cries and doubts for a stolen election were immediately shared by the ODM party and international electoral observers (Markussen, July 2011). However the notion that the election was rigged seemed to be biased. The study sought to discuss in depth the nature of the 2007 post election violence in relation to the situation in Eldoret East district.

The 2007 post election violence was based on ethnicity, since Kenya political is divided under ethnic lines. Thus, in describing critically the 2007 post election violence, the study sought to investigate how the clashes shaped the future of the people in Eldoret East district and Kenya as a whole.

### **2.3. Causes of Ethnic Violence**

This section handled the causes of ethnic violence according to different authors. Notably, Onyango (1995) noted that ethnic conflicts were majorly caused by political grudges. To him, some of the political grudges were as a result of numerous socio-economic and political grudges between or within the numerous ethnic communities in African states. Although it had been noted that political grudges contributed to ethnic violence, it had not been established whether this was the fact in Eldoret East district. Thus, the researcher would establish whether political grudges were the root cause of the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district.

In addition to the political grudges, Onyango (May, 1995) pointed out that the political elite had exploited the different ethnic identities found within Kenya for their own political agendas. Close to political grudges was the aspect of political favoritism. According to Danson (February 22, 2008), the incompatibility of the ethnic groups in Kenya as a result of colonial administration had far reaching effects on the Kenyan political dimension. He observed that, political favoritism has proven to be unavoidable, so, Kenyans invariably support the political candidate of their own ethnic group, to the extent that most of the main opposition parties were divided, largely along ethnic lines. However, it was not clear whether the same was applicable to Eldoret East where the study was carried. As a result the study went out to establish the reality therein based on the views of the respondents.

Another factor that had fueled ethnic tensions as informed by the African Watch Report (November, 1993), was the issue of land ownership in Kenya's fertile Rift Valley. It made a

close introspection related to the British colonial rule as a cause of ethnic violence saying that the pastoral Kalenjin and Maasai inhabited the Rift Valley region prior to the colonial era. It observed, however, that in 1915 British colonialists forced pastoral groups off the land, so they could develop the area agriculturally by planting cash crops like tea and coffee. It narrated empirically that the colonialists coerced thousands of Kikuyu, Abagusii, Luhya, and Luo, who were all experienced farmers, to move to the Rift Valley to work on the farms as sharecroppers. As a result, the Report informed that over the first 20 years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the claimed traditional inhabitants of the Rift Valley, the Kalenjin and the Maasai, were forcefully displaced from their homelands by the colonial administration. Soon, thousands of non-native Rift Valley dwellers with agricultural experience, like Kikuyu, settled in the Rift Valley. Consequently, this shift in ownership of Kenya's most fertile land was a key element of the ethnic tension between these groups.

Unequal distribution of resources was another cause of ethnic conflicts. According to Arthur (1979), apart from their easy access to land, the economic success of the Kikuyu region in the first ten years of Kenya's independence was enviable by other ethnic groups. He accounted that the Kikuyu community enjoyed good modern roads, education facilities, expanded health services, piped water, electricity and other forms of infrastructure. Additionally, the Kikuyu politicians helped their members to acquire land and businesses. They visibly outdistanced other ethnic groups at a pace that posed immediate political risks to their newly acquired positions in the government structures. This means that the situation had been growing so rapidly that it might result to ethnic violence during the 2007 general elections.

Another cause of ethnic clashes was the introduction of federalism as a form of political system in Kenya. Arthur (1979) submitted that the advocates of federalism in the built up for the 1992 general elections and after, often called for the expulsion of all other ethnic groups

from land occupied before colonialism by the Kalenjins and other pastoral ethnic groups. It was imperative to judge fairly as Nyukuri (1997) wrote saying that the recent federalism debate was recipe of chaos, ethnic animosity, and conflict that befell Kenya between 1991 and 1997. However, it was not clear how well it fostered the post election violence of 2007 which was the major concern of the study.

In relation to federal politics, ethnic prejudice and subsequent conflict is attributed to the Africanization of the civil service as Nyukuri (1997) informed. Just as there was immediate need to Africanize the land, the government moved equally fast to give jobs in the civil service and Para-government sector to the Africans. Independence had after all been fought for on the popular slogan "Uhuru na Kazi" (independence will bring jobs). During the colonial period, the African population had worked essentially as plantation laborers or domestic lands for the Whites. It was therefore natural that independence could give mobility into the higher echelons of the labor market as a realization of self-governance. Understandably, the government came up with a policy, first described as Africanization, then Kenyanization, and eventually, by some unofficial baptism Kikuyunization and currently Kalenjinzation. This terminological mutation succinctly explained how a policy, otherwise well-conceived, deteriorated into the ethnicization of employment in the civil service. As a result ethnic conflicts over the years could be understood within this framework. However, the study sought to assess post election violence of 2007. How the causes indentified above contributed to the post election violence of 2007 remained a major concern that the study wanted to underscore.

#### **2.4. Effects of Ethnic Violence**

There were many effects of ethnic clashes as suggested by different authors. The first effect of ethnic clashes was the mass loss of life. A report given by Gatere (2011) reckoned that

over 5000 people died property worth millions destroyed and thousands of its citizens displaced. While this might be true, the report given was too general to refer to the problem that was under investigation. The study anticipated to investigate and ascertain that mass loss of life was as a consequence of 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district.

A part from mass loss of human life mentioned above, Jeff (2000), asserted that displacement of persons due to ethnic violence was another consequence that had created an enormous influx of refugees into Kenya particularly in the northern camps of Kakuma and Dadaab. In 1992, he reckoned that the number of refugees in Kenya reached 420,000. The above report was not addressing the case of Eldoret East in relation to the effects of the 2007 post election violence. The respondents of the study would establish whether there was displacement of persons in Eldoret East district as a result of 2007 ethnic violence.

Ethnic clashes have resulted to fear and insecurity among the Kenya society. According to Yieke (2007), in a situation where feelings of insecurity, uncertainty, and fear arising from adverse circumstances do not exist, social groups are less inclined to pay much importance to their ethnic identity. This information given above was submitted in a broad sense. The study findings were yet to confirm precisely whether insecurity and fear in Eldoret East district have been caused by ethnic conflicts.

The introduction of dangerous weapons of various kinds which have been used in the previous Kenyan ethnic clashes was mentioned by Gatere (2011) as a consequence of ethnic violence in the country. For example, machetes, bows and arrows were well known to be traditional weapons for the communities like the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Masai, Abagusii among others in Kenya, but the increased flow of refugees from war torn Somalia and Sudan had resulted in a proliferation of small arms, like AK-47s and Kalashnikovs, in Kenya. It was not clear however, whether the introduction of dangerous weapons was as an effect of ethnic

clashes in Eldoret East district. The respondents of the study were yet to give us a clear report on that note.

A part from the illegal importation and use of dangerous weapons, ethnic clashes have had an effect on psycho-social aspect of the Kenya people. Nyukuri (1992), described this aspect saying that most of the victims of these clashes were left homeless, landless, destitute, injured, dead, abused, to mention but a few of the atrocities resulting from the menace. If that was the case, the study was yet to establish whether ethnic clashes had led to psycho-social problems in Eldoret East district during or after the 2007 post election violence.

The psycho-social effect mentioned above was not the only consequence of ethnic clashes. Large areas of forest land were set on fire as part of a defensive strategy taken by victims of the clashes, to deny their attackers' hiding grounds. In this case, Nyukuri (1992) wrote, "The consequence of massive destruction of forests as was witnessed during the ethnic clashes in Kenya would therefore affect the pattern and intensity of rainfall and subsequently affect the viability of rain-fed agriculture and water supply in the affected areas." The above findings did not mention anything to do with Eldoret East district concerning the massive destruction of forests as a result of ethnic clashes. The study therefore, endeavored to discuss whether massive destruction of forests in Eldoret East was due to 2007 ethnic violence in the region.

Having mentioned the destruction of forests as an effect of ethnic clashes, the deteriorating health condition of the clash victims was projected as another consequence of ethnic violence. 'According to Simala (1996), thousands of displaced families, having lost their shelters and food supplies, had to camp in over-crowded temporary shelters organized through donations and support from various organizations, such as the Catholic Mission, Red Cross, NCCCK, and Action-Aid Kenya. These camps were established haphazardly all over the clashes zones and had poor ventilation. He reported that the grossly inadequate water supply

and sanitation facilities, coupled with overcrowding, made these camps ideal conditions for major outbreaks of communicable diseases such as meningitis, typhoid, upper respiratory tract infections, cholera and other related diseases. He submitted also that the mixing of people with cattle, sheep, chicken, goats and other domestic animals was in itself a health hazard. The study anticipated getting clear information on this regard through the respondents.

The clashes in various parts of the country brought about a situation of gender and child vulnerability. Indeed, it was the children and women who suffered more during the period of the clashes as Nyukuri (1992) pointed out. He rendered that those women were abused, violated, embarrassed and at times raped in broad daylight during the ethnic clashes. In most internal refugee camps, there was inadequate room to accommodate thousands of the displaced families. He added that both men and women, together with children, were forced to share the often congested sleeping places in close proximity with one another with little or no privacy. Consequently, it led to indiscriminate sexual abuse. As a result of such immoral practices, he regretted that sexual transmitted infections and HIV/AIDS were passed from one individual to another, with children and women being the most affected victims of the circumstances. The study findings however, was to establish the situation in Eldoret East district.

Apart from the vulnerability of gender, ethnic clashes resulted to economic problems such as food insecurity, labor disruption on farms, industry and the public sector institutions, destruction of property, land grabbing, commercial disruption, break down in transport and communication, resource diversion, misallocation and unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices. According to the Task Force Report (1992), food shortage was one of the far reaching economic consequences of ethnic clashes in the

affected areas. The Report states, “Many clashes victims experienced famine and this necessitated the appeal for local and international food aid and relief as a result of ethnic violence.” The study however, was to find out the effects of ethnic in Eldoret East district visavis the 2007 PEV.

## CHAPTER THREE

### METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Introduction

This section discussed the methodology or plan that was used to carry out the study. The section presented the locale of the study, the research design, the study population, the sample size, the sampling procedures, and instruments for data collection, the procedure of data collection, and data processing and analysis.

#### 3.2. Locale of Study

This research was carried out in Eldoret East district. Eldoret East district is one of the seventy-one districts of Kenya, located in the Rift Valley Province. The district has a cool and temperate climate and is located on a plateau. It has a total area of 1,821.8Sq.Km<sup>2</sup>. It extends between longitude 34° 50' and 35 ° 37' east and 0° 03' and 0° 55' north. The district shares common borders with Trans Nzoia district to the North, Keiyo to the East, Wareng to the South, and Soy to the West.

#### 3.3. Research Design

This study was descriptive in nature and employed qualitative research methodology. The appropriate design for such a study as it offers promise to getting to reality in a way that single method of study may not achieve. Qualitative methodology was necessary in studying 2007 post election violence and the response of Seventh-day Adventist Church in Eldoret East district. It also made it possible to demonstrate the action logics of the actors involved, the description and the associated techniques, the analysis of the popular representations and forms of justification and condemnation associated with ethnic violence. The qualitative approach enabled the researcher to illuminate the specific, to identify phenomena through how they are perceived by the actors in a situation. Apart from providing the contextual

practice of 2007 post election violence in the study area, it also ensured the description of the Seventh-day Adventist Church's response.

Qualitative approach allowed use of triangulation employing cross sectional survey research design, to ascertain the views of different types of people in relation to the study. The cross sectional research design in a sense deals with different types (group) of respondents. Thus, descriptive research design was used because it provided information as it were without much alteration and enabled the researcher to describe the 2007 PEV and the response of Seventh-day Adventist Church in Eldoret East district.

#### **3.4. Study Population**

The study targeted the Seventh-day Adventists in Eldoret East district, Rift valley province in Kenya. The total population of Seventh-day Adventists in Eldoret East district is about 2960 church members and two pastors in the twelve churches of the entire parish. The researcher interviewed both the Church leaders and ordinary Church members especially those that had lived in Eldoret East for a long time because they were the ones with rich information regarding the study. He too interviewed both the peasants and government officials who were S.D.A members.

#### **3.5. Sample Size**

The participants in the study were church members, pastors among the twelve churches, Church leaders and government officials who were S.D.A members. A total of 144 respondents participated in the study.

#### **3.6. Sampling Procedure**

The study employed purposeful sampling. Purposeful sampling enabled the researcher to pick out the key subjects who had rich information needed in the study. This enabled the

researcher to pick out the most suitable persons to give relevant information concerning the study.

### **Research Instruments for Data Collection**

The study employed questionnaire, interview schedules and observations as tools for collecting data.

#### **3.7.1. Introduction**

In pursuance of the study objectives, the researcher used interview schedules for collecting data. Interview allowed the researcher to get into the lives of the subjects as well as giving them room to express their feelings freely regarding the 2007 PEV and the response of the Seventh - day Adventist in Eldoret East district. Interview was considered to be flexible and allowed the researcher to re-adjust the questions if there was need in order to obtain the relevant data. The interview comprised open ended questions.

#### **3.7.2. Procedure of Data Collection**

The researcher received an introductory letter from the Department of Religious Studies of Kyambogo University, both Research Authorization and Research Clearance Permit from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation of Kenya, and the Ministry of Education of Kenya. He proceeded to Eldoret East district for data collection. Due to the sensitivity of the topic which brought about skepticism, the researcher trained one research assistant from the local community to assist him in data collection.

#### **3.7.3. Data Processing and Analysis**

The instruments for data collection were checked by both research supervisors who ascertained their validity. The collected data was prepared for processing. This involved

organizing the data into manageable units, categorizing it according to the objectives, and comparing for easy analysis. Data for each objective was analyzed separately using thematic description. It was then validated, edited, and coded. Analyzing of data was purely qualitative in nature for the objectives of the study.

#### **3.7.4. Ethical Considerations**

The researcher was very open and honest to explain the purpose and aim of the study to his respondents. The information given by respondents which facilitated the collection of data was seriously taken into consideration.

The researcher did not discriminate any person on the basis of gender, marital status, age, religion, economical status, educational status or even ethnicity. Only those who were willing were involved in the interviews; no one was ever forced to take part in the exercise.

The researcher respected the confidentiality and anonymity of any participant who requested for it.

The researcher complied with the rules and regulations set by scientific Research Standards. In this case, the researcher was never involved in plagiarism. He credited the various authors of the information he collected when carrying out the study.

The researcher did not use any abusive language that could imply harming a person, group of persons or any organization when addressing the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district and the response of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in the region.

#### **3.7.5. Research Constraints**

The researcher encountered the following limitations;

Firstly, Eldoret East district had a problem of transport. It was hard to access some parts of the district because of poor roads. The researcher used assistants who reached the remaining parts of the district.

Secondly, some of the respondents were be very busy and difficult to get. The researcher made effective appointments with such subjects through phone calls. Thirdly, delays for filling and returning the questionnaire. Since the researcher dealt with subjects most of who were in Churches, he constantly and carefully reminded the leaders and the respondents about it.

Fourthly, the respondents misinterpreted the data. The researcher in this case engaged in pilot study as a means to solve this problem.

Fifthly, the researcher faced much suspicion and skepticism. Some of the respondents were not ready to disclose information regarding the 2007 post election violence for fear of victimization. The researcher used assistants from various ethnic groups in Eldoret East district who openly explained the purpose of the study in the area. They said that the study was for academic purposes only.

In some cases, the researcher was limited to speaking the local language during the sessions. Not every local person is able to speak or understand the English language. The researcher used young people who have skills not only

Some of the respondents became very emotional during the study as they remembered the losses they incurred during the 2007 PEV. For example, those that had lost family members shade tears of sorrow at the mere mention of the topic of the study. The researcher comforted them and prayed for them before persuading them to respond to the study.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CRITICAL DESCRIPTION OF 2007 POST ELECTION VIOLENCE

#### 4.1: Introduction

This section critically described the 2007 PEV, therein causes were surveyed and the effects of 2007 PEV in Eldoret East district.

#### 4.2: Critical Description of the 2007 Post Election Violence

Kenya had been riddled with conflict and violence throughout its brief history as a nation. The country of Kenya was ruled by the iron hands of two men in succession from 1963 to 2002: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi (1978-2002) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the ruling political party. KANU's dominance was achieved by banning opposition parties in 1969 leaving Kenya a *de facto* one-party State to a *de jure* one-party State when a constitutional amendment in 1978 ruled that no other party was able to contest in the elections (Gutierrez-Romero, 2008). The life experience that has shaped the typical Kenyan citizen's understanding of conflict is similar to those in post-colonial nations that have succumbed to dictatorship. In the Kenyan context, this translates into the average citizen believing that the executive branch always wins, and that those in power will do whatever it takes to stay in power. This was seen with Kenyatta (a Kikuyu who was Kenya's first president) who utilized his position to consolidate power by encouraging KANU members of parliament (MPs) to make significant ratifications to the constitution between 1964 and 1969, thus effectively create a dictatorship. Upon Kenyatta's death in 1978, Moi (from the Kalenjin tribe) assumed the presidency through his constitutional right as Vice President, and was able to take advantage of the vast infrastructure of executive power Kenyatta had created. This was especially seen by Moi's ability to abolish the multiparty system through an amendment to the constitution in 1982, effectively making him head of both the executive branch and Parliament (Mutua, 2008). In my

view, however, anybody would do what both President Kenyatta and President Moi did no matter which tribe they belonged.

In 1991 after much pressure from Kenyan activists and the international community multi-party elections were re-introduced (Markussen July, 2011). According to Kwanja (2003) several opposition parties emerged (Ford Kenya, Ford Asili, Democratic Party of Kenya, National Development of Kenya, Social Democratic Party, and other smaller parties). Nonetheless, KANU remained in power winning the general elections of 1992 and 1997 amid violence and allegations of electoral irregularities. Much of the violence occurred during the pre-elections period and was concentrated in the Rift Valley and Western provinces and apparent local 'Kalenjin warriors' attacked the homes and farms of migrant non-Kalenjin groups. Even when the multiparty system reemerged in 1991, Moi was able to use his position to limit the opposition through intimidation as well as create votes through voting fraud in the elections of 1992 and 1997. For example in the 1992 election, it is estimated that around 1 million youth were not allowed to register to vote because they were denied the national identity cards needed to register (Mutua, 2008). This is an example of structural violence. However, the researcher's opinion was that the opposition parties which were formed to rally against KANU would not win the general elections of 1992 and 1997. This is because KANU was more organized than the opposition.

In 2002, there was a change and KANU, collapsed. It collapsed beneath a new political party comprised of an alliance that had formed between all of the major Kenyan tribes (Mara, September 2009). This political stakeholder was named the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Within NARC, the following agreements had been reached as conditions for appointing Kibaki as a presidential candidate for the 2002 election (Daily Nation, October

23rd, 2002): (1) divide the cabinet posts equally between the Democratic Party (DP) group which was led by Kibaki and the other group which was led by Odinga, (2) set up a new constitution and devolve to Prime Minister part of the authority that the president held under the existing constitution, and (3) support Mr. Odinga to be elected as the Prime Minister. The election victory was a landslide. Mwai Kibaki of the NARC won 62% of the vote on a platform of fighting corruption, forming a coalition government that shared power amongst the various tribes, and changing the constitution within 100 days of being elected to limit the executive power that had ballooned over the previous four decades (Mutua, 2008; Calas, 2008). Most people felt hope that the country's government was finally on the verge of a system of governance that would have accountability through shared power (Mara, 2009; Takashi, et al. September, 2010). According to the researcher, NARC Coalition was still wanting because not all tribes in Kenya were represented in the coalition. To him, several tribes were marginalized.

Within few weeks of election the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that forged the tribal factions into the NARC alliance and that got Kibaki elected as president had effectively collapsed. The agreement in the MOU to share power within the cabinet did not occur as four key positions that were to be created, including that of a Prime Minister position, did not materialize forward (Mutua, 2008). Kibaki, from the Kikuyu tribe, broke his election promise and filled many appointed positions with fellow tribesmen, thus following in the footsteps of his presidential predecessors by selecting people for appointed positions primarily through tribal bias (Mutua, 2008). This in turn led to discrimination of many people of other tribes who were equally qualified (Mara, 2009).

Additionally, as the new government was formed, the process of cabinet formation and constitutional reform faced constant delay, and the relationship between the camps under NARC started to fall apart. This left many citizens tasting what could have been and frustrated over what should have resulted from the new government to power in 2002 (Mara, 2009). The existing constitution then, which had been written at the time of independence from the British, gave the Kenyan president significant power initially designed to overcome obstacles for the newly created country. During the presidential campaign for the 2002 election, NARC pleaded to devolve certain presidential power to other posts and regional governments as already mentioned. However, the “new” constitution proposal, which was drafted under a close supervision of the newly elected president Kibaki, failed to devolve much of the presidential power. The draft was eventually vetoed by the disillusioned public in the referendum of 2005, greatly undermining public support for President Kibaki. Meanwhile, Odinga newly formed a political force namely the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) which was an opposition party. ODM continued to gain support throughout the country by setting up the Pentagon or a political partnership among regional politicians from not only Nyanza Province where Odinga comes from but also from the Western, Rift Valley, Eastern, and Coastal Provinces. The significance of this partnership was that ODM was given a national outlook (Markussen, July, 2011). While the above claims seem to be true, am of a different view. The researcher dismissed what the ODM claimed to be delays in cabinet formation. He was also of the view that matters concerning constitutional reforms were so critical that they needed not only more time, but also formidable structures. He therefore surmised that ODM seemed to be power-thirsty and impatient.

The 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, however, was of a different magnitude. Thus, this section made an analysis of 2007 PEV. In the 2007 general election, most Kenyans invested

their faith in the electoral process. As Murunga (2011) noted that Kenyans not only expected a transparent process and outcome, but also assumed the incumbent would, at the very least, respect their choice. According to Independent Review Commission (2008) on the general election that was chaired by a former South African appeal court judge, Johann Kriegler, Kenyans registered to vote in vast numbers, braved long queues, the hot sun or rainy conditions, and cast their votes in a relatively peaceful process. The researcher however was of the view that suffering on long queues while voting did not mean a win for either PNU or ODM. He held that it was the prerogative of the Electoral Commission of Kenya chairperson to announce the presidential poll result to determine the winner.

During the political campaigns, two major parties contested during 2007 general elections. The ODM had a strong institutional framework known as the “Pentagon”- in the persons of Henry Koskei and William Ruto from Rift Valley, Musalia Mudavadi from Western, Joseph Nyagah from Eastern and Najib Balala from Coast, and later Charity Ngilu from Eastern and representing women’s interests. ODM and its presidential candidate had more or less locked up most regional votes. The ODM “Pentagon” aimed at power-sharing arrangement across the provinces, as well as redistribution of resources, equitable development and resolution of the constitutional stalemate (Macarthur, 2008). Musalia Mudavadi was Odinga’s viable running mate, with Rift Valley’s William Ruto expected to become the Prime Minister in the ODM government. Equally disaffected were voters in Coast Province, a rich region which had been fully exploited by upcountry people at the expense of the coastal people who now had the chance to vote out an unpopular, untrustworthy government which had perpetuated longstanding marginalization of this potentially rich region. With Nyanza province’s longstanding disaffection with previous governments and Rift Valley province opposing Kibaki for ungratefulness to the region, after Moi an alliance between them was to be

expected. Most unexpected, however, was Western province, with a former short-lived Vice President - Musalia Mudavadi - becoming part of a formidable opposition. The researcher however held that there seemed nothing new in the formation of the Pentagon team other than tribalism of the highest order. In his opinion, the ODM sought to include key players (representatives of major tribes) in their team against the Kikuyu tribe.

Macarthur (2008) noted that PNU, was for the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki the man who had become President in 2002-2007 when Raila Odinga's famous "Kibaki *tosha*" (Kiswahili for Kibaki "fits the bid") wooed majority vote for him and crippled Uhuru Kenyatta, the KANU Presidential candidate in 2002 who was easily dismissed as a 'Moi project', that is, Moi's proxy to maintain the status quo. The PNU camp was more in Central Province and the northern portion of Eastern Province (better known as the Mount Kenya region) but drew support from a divided KANU, NARC-Kenya, Ford Kenya with a home in part of Western Province, New Ford Kenya which split from it, Safina Party, Shirikisho and other smaller parties. The PNU party thus, had more of the strong leaders from the Kikuyu community. PNU was more of a patchwork of several parties posturing for the booty and having a candidate who was not too sure of votes beyond the Mount Kenya region. The researcher didn't see anything wrong for the PNU to have had members from Mount Kenya region yet, served to the interest of all Kenyans. In this case, the researcher had a different opinion. Given that ODM had formed the Pentagon team, PNU had to find a way for future survival by involving those members who were pro-government.

In the run-up to the 2007 elections, both ODM and PNU subtly appealed to ethnic identity and ethnic prejudice. Opinion polls taken before elections reveal strong correlations between ethnicity and voting intentions (Kimenyi and Gutierrez-Romero, 2008). The message of

change propagated by ODM made the young voters hopeful that things might just be different next time around. The 2007 general election was a contest of Kenyan veterans vis-à-vis younger and more popular politicians who relied on specific alliances which they believed would win the day. For post-*uhuru* (Kiswahili for 'independence') children then aged anything up to 43 years, the election marked their moment of reckoning, an opportunity for determining change in the country and a challenge to consign the older generation to political wilderness. In relation to the above, the researcher felt that there was political competition between the two major parties. He observed that politicians were only playing games with the minds of the youth who believed that there was going to be a new dawn in their lives if ODM won the 2007 poll and therefore, influenced them to vote in vast numbers.

In response to the election uncertainties Mwai Kibaki the incumbent was to maintain power using all means. In his view, the researcher surmised that this was meant to achieve the long agenda for the Kikuyu people and fulfill Moi's plans of the 2002 "project". Kibaki had to cling to power until Uhuru Kenyatta, President Jomo Kenyatta's son, assumes power. The Kikuyu's unpredictable movement involved in petty trade, transportation business and other income-generating activities taking place. This "business migration" entails largely movement of people from Central Province to other parts of Kenya where they run shops or kiosks, *matatu* transport and vendors of all manner of business. There is never overt complaint against such business people until a crisis such as post election violence emerges. A few weeks towards the 2007 general election, rumours had it that large numbers of Administration Police had been transported to the ODM strongholds in Nyanza province either to vote for the incumbent or to cause mayhem to disenfranchise registered voters. Photographs taken and television footages by the media verified transportation of unknown people to undisclosed destinations a few days towards the general election, and local people

reacted angrily by stopping the buses and beating up their occupants who failed to identify themselves, some of them escaping (Kimenyi and Gutierrez-Romero, 2008).

In context, the researcher was of the view that whether ODM took over government, there would have been some ethnic violence, but with a lesser magnitude than what was witnessed during the 2007 post election violence. He thought that ODM taking power would mean that the majority of the people from different ethnic background would have settled down more freely than what was seen during the violence. This is because violence was caused by power struggle among ethnic groups. Attacks targeting certain ethnic groups induced revenge attacks, resulting in over two months of civil unrest throughout Kenya. As much as taking power could not have stopped the ethnic violence, the major issue that the contest between the incumbent President Kibaki, a Kikuyu, and the opposition candidate Odinga, of Luo origin, each of whom involved different ethnic groups to form a coalition for the election campaign. Odinga represented the voice of the smaller ethnic groups that have felt marginalized by the central government and yearned for devolution of power. On the other hand, President Kibaki represented the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, and others who favored a strong centralized system (Nguyen, 2007; Gibson and Long, 2009). However, as many experts had anticipated election-related ethnic conflicts would occur in Kenya because ethnic clashes had become a common phenomenon during and after the presidential elections since 1992 when the first election under the multi-party system was held (Kimenyi and Ndung'u, 2005).

During the campaigns the opinion polls showed Odinga leading. Gibson and Long, (2009) observed that he opened a wider lead in September and October 2007 and maintained a slim lead up to eleven days before the poll date must have been a source of worry for Kibaki and the PNU. They added that for the first time in Kenya's history, an incumbent President was

trailing in opinion polls and his defeat was expected unless something extra-ordinarily favorable to him happened. The extra-ordinary occurrence was the announcement of the presidential election results in the evening of 30 December 2007, followed by an unprecedented situation of hurried swearing in of Mwai Kibaki a few minutes thereafter.

The time leading up to the general elections was quite hopeful and the day of election, 27<sup>th</sup> of December, 2007, went rather smoothly according to many observers and journalists (Steven, December, 2008). There was relatively little political violence before the 2007 general elections (Markussen, July 2011; Ksoll et al. May 2009). Steven (2008), noted that observers from Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ) which was an account of the irregularities that showed up on the 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> of December, the last two days during the tallying process. All had run smoothly until about 3.00pm when unusually long delays in receiving ballots started to concern the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) Commissioners, since none were experienced in the 2002 general elections. At around 4.00pm, discrepancies began to show up in the tallying between the main ECK tallying center and the local constituency tallying centers. Throughout the night, tensions heightened in the ECK as serious anomalies arose according to Steven, (2008). First, the forms that were received did not match up with the results that were phoned in. In many cases, the documents were photocopied (law requires that they be originals) and many were submitted without the proper signatures of agents and officers at the local stations (Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice). The situation was worse in relation to the recruitment and training of temporary personnel. The recruitment did not into account the requirements of the approved method for the tallying and transmission of results at constituency level, as it did not include the required qualifications in the process (Kriegler and Waki Report on 2007 Elections).

In relation to the above, there were many cases of ECK Commissioners allowing the officers to “correct” the mistakes and resubmit them. ECK regulations also stated that any results showing a voter turnout of 100 percent or higher should not be accepted. This regulation was violated. An example is a result from Maragwa (Central Kenya), which showed a 115 percent voter turnout. However, the officer was allowed to alter the result to 85.24 percent and was accepted by the ECK! Despite all the inconsistencies and violations, results were still being announced, though it was against law as well! At around midnight, one of the ECK senior staff disclosed to a KPTJ observer that discrepancies had been systematically planned and not accidental, as a scheme involving most of the ECK Commissioners. On Sunday morning ECK began printing up tally results that were much higher than submitted results and denied observers opportunity to verify files. On Sunday afternoon, the ODM party announced that poll results had been manipulated by the ECK and demanded a resolution (Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice).

As mentioned above, during the voting time Raila Odinga of ODM party held a lead of over one million votes ahead of Mwai Kibaki, yet only hours before the closing of voting, that lead transformed into a thin margin of victory for Kibaki. The result was also in a stark contrast with ODM’s parliamentary votes which won 99 seats to the PNU’s 43 seats (Human Rights Watch, 20, no.1 2008). At around 5.30pm the ECK Chairperson announced Mwai Kibaki as the winner of the presidential election. Hours after the announcement of this highly controversial outcome, Kibaki was sworn in as president in a ceremony witnessed only by a few political backers and not broadcasted on television. The researcher was of the view that it was necessary to swear in Kibaki as president as soon as possible following the prevailing circumstances and to organize for the security of the country as the commander in chief of the Kenya Defense Forces. In a press conference on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2008, Samuel Kivuitu, the ECK

Chairman, acknowledged that irregularities had occurred and, stunningly enough, admitted that he did not know for sure who had actually won the election (Markussen, July 2011).

Soon a dark cloud settled on the Kenyan scene as another extra-ordinary response, a post-election violence never seen before in Kenya, erupted in different parts of the country.

Immediately after the announcement of the presidential election results, violence erupted almost simultaneously in a number of different locations (Steven, December 2008; Markussen, July 2011). In Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret and other urban centers, angry mobs took to the streets. The police reacted to these activities with fierce use of force and killed a large number of persons, especially in Kisumu town. In the multi-ethnic slums of Nairobi ethnic based fighting erupted and more than 100 persons were killed. In rural areas and towns of the Rift Valley and other provinces, militias were organized to attack the settlements of ethnic groups perceived as rivals. Most violence was of a “low-tech” nature, conducted mostly with machetes, clubs, bows and arrows. Only the police made significant use of firearms (Markussen, 2011).

According to Steven (December, 2008), the 2007 post-election violence occurred over the course of the following month, with certain periods of intense violence. The United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Mission to Kenya (February 2008) notes roughly 3 periods of heightened conflict: immediately after the elections, mid –January (16<sup>th</sup> - 18<sup>th</sup>) and during the last week of the month. The initial wave of evidence occurred in the form of riots and demonstrations, and was primarily a reaction from angry ODM supporters who felt the election was stolen from them and stormed the streets in large crowds. Seeing the reaction of the public, the Kibaki government placed a blanket ban on all public demonstrations which was actually illegal according to the law, but justified it as necessary

means to prevent further violence and chaos. However, the requirement of a heavy police presence resulted in numerous deadly clashes between police and crowds. Though Kenyan police were sent to disperse rioters, some reports indicate that they targeted specifically opposition supporters and assisted pro-government gangs (Markussen, July 2011).

As the clashes went on, they became more targeted, deliberate and ethicized (United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Mission to Kenya, February 2008). Primarily, Kikuyu communities seen to be supportive of Kibaki were driven from their homes and killed. The final wave of violence occurred at the end of January as a Kikuyu retaliation for the first attacks. After the violence had subdued, reports indicated there were deaths and 41,396 houses burned, and approximately 300,000 people were displaced during the riots and lived in IDP camps. Under this intense competition, the exit poll predicted Odinga to be slightly in the lead for the presidential seat. The exit poll suggested that Odinga had won the seat registering 46.1 percent of total votes against Kibaki's 40.2 percent. The ODM declared victory for Raila Odinga on 29 December but as more results were announced on the same day, the lead that Odinga had shrunk to only 38,000 votes with 90% of the votes counted. Against the predictions of opinion polls and the early counts of the votes, the Election Commission of Kenya found Mwai Kibaki the winner of the presidential election on 30 December, placing him ahead of Odinga by 232,000 votes. The result contradicted the parliamentary election that was conducted at the same time as Odinga's ODM won against President Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) by a large margin as already mentioned. Cries and doubts for a stolen election were immediately shared by the ODM party and international electoral observers (Markussen, July 2011).

On 2 January 2009 Samuel Kivuitu, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission, admitted "I do not know whether Kibaki won the election" (Ongiri, 2008). Kivuitu also revealed that he was put under pressure by "some PNU and ODM-Kenya leaders" by calling him frequently and asking to announce the results immediately. Kivuitu agreed to take the presidential election winner's certificate to the State House after "some people threatened to collect it...". To Kivuitu's surprise "the Chief Justice was already there ready to swear-in Kibaki". Kivuitu agreed to announce the results because the Electoral Commission had no legal mandate to investigate complaints raised by the opposition immediately. It was a matter for the courts to investigate the irregularities.

According to the media reports, after the elections and especially once the results were announced, the opposition party supporters went on an unprecedented level of 'orgy of violence' which led to counter attacks and 'revenge killings' (Otieno, 2009; The Standard, 2009). Violence spread to five out of the eight provinces in Kenya (Nairobi, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Western, Coast and Central). The bulk of the violence was reported in Nairobi and the Rift Valley, due to the proximity between feuding ethnic communities in these places. Initially, the main targets of the violence were the Kikuyu people, to which President Kibaki belonged. They were attacked in various spots including Kibera Slum of Nairobi, in the city of Kisumu of Nyanza Province, and locations in Coastal Province that are inhabited by Kikuyu and Luo people. In Rift Valley Province, not only spontaneous attacks but also more systematic raids, mainly organized by groups of Kalenjin origin, occurred (Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, 2008). January 2008 was dominated by demonstrations with the slogan 'No Raila, no peace!' as the ODM called several times for nationwide demonstrations aimed at forcing the elected president to resign (De Smedt, 2009). In the Rift Valley revenge attacks which began in Nakuru in late January rose in intensity and spread

along the main highway to affect the towns of Naivasha and also Limuru and Kikuyu in the Central province. In Nairobi, the police tried to stop demonstrations with water cannon, teargas, arrests and barricades between slums and wealthier suburbs resulting in more clashes (De Smedt, 2009) and more alleged cases of people killed by police bullets.

Thus, the violence witnessed in the wake of Kenya's 2007 general election has a consistent history, namely a contest between reactionaries who insist on status quo to ensure their grip of power and revolutionaries who would stop at nothing before change engulfs Kenya. The two parties were strange bedfellows; reactionaries (exclusively within the PNU) pledged continuation of the status quo while their opponents, the ODM, clamored for change which the NARC government had failed to deliver. This analysis sheds light on ethnic balkanization of the country and its implications for bloc voting; the emergent pattern of regional voting blocs and swing provinces; the electorate's consciousness of and sensitivity which moved them to vote out the Kibaki regime; a call by the proponents of change for reinvigoration of a stalled revolution; heightened mistrust among political leaders in the run-up to the 2007 general election; and the crave for devolution and regionalism as an alternative to a powerful central governance.

In summary, the 2007 post-election violence was triggered by the announcement that Mwai Kibaki won the presidential election which causes violence across much of the country. However, not all violence erupted 'spontaneously'. Violence broke out in Nairobi slums and other major cities and soon developed into a series of attacks throughout the country, quickly worsening the public order that was not to be restored for over two months (Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, 2008; Human Right Watch, 2008). The 2007 PEV was based on ethnicity, since Kenya political is divided under ethnic lines. Thus, in describing the

2007 post election violence, one can never do away with the ethnicity which plays a vital role in Kenya's politics. Political parties in Kenya typically fall under tribal lines, valuing ethnicity above political ideology and policy. This is due to the perception that the party offers the best hope for one within the tribe to assume power and then share state resources with tribal members (Mutua, 2008). The result of this view has historically been tribalism or prejudice across tribes, and favoritism within the tribe. As mentioned above, the Kenyan culture is deeply tribal. The average person identifies with the tribe and values the tribe. In addition to this, Kenyans are an inherently agrarian society. This means that land is very important. Indeed, the topic of land has been an acute issue in the majority of conflicts since Kenyan independence, the history of which is discussed in detail under the Stakeholder mapping tool. The issue of land in Kenya is central in its history of conflict and is an example of structural violence. This is in part because of long and complex histories of land dealings among tribes. Often the members of the tribe in power were unethically given or allowed to use land, frequently at the expense of other tribes. This is also in part due to the complex legal structure surrounding land (there are at least 42 laws that apply to land, some of which contradict to the other) combined with the weak judicial branch to carry out these laws effectively (Calas, 2008). During the 2007 post-election violence, the historic land issues between the Kikuyu and Kalenjins continued to be a major cause of conflict. Thus, Post-election violence resulting from the abnormalities seen in the 2007 election in Kenya involved many facets of society. Perhaps the most volatile of these were youth with little opportunity within the previous Kibaki government for jobs and had even less hope for the future. The ODM understood this and harnessed the youth vote by organizing them, for the first time in a Kenyan election, into voting blocks.

### **4.3: Causes of the 2007 Post Election Violence**

#### **4.3.1 Manipulation by Leaders**

It was found out that manipulation by leaders contributed to the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East District. It was noted that the process of manipulation was a long term aspect that was sparked by rigged election of 2007. During the previous general elections, Kenya had suffered major structural change and found itself on a dangerous political crossroads. National intellectuals and leaders used the weapons of nationalist rhetoric to intensify ethnic divisions and ethnic intolerance which culminated into violence shortly after the 2007 elections. Prior to the elections, the economic, political and social crisis caused a readily “mobilizable” emotional response. National leaders of the Kalenjin communities used the rhetoric of “us” (our ethnic/national group) being exploited by “them” (other ethnic/national groups like the Kikuyus and Abagusii). People developed grudges against each other. The manipulation of emotions culminated in the violence which, as one respondent noted “was the expression of a politically organized attempt to radically redefine categories of belonging.” Everybody was afraid about the uncertain fate of Eldoret East, especially after the news of the general election results of 2007, reportedly purported for rigged elections.

Respondents lamented that the eruption of violence could not have occurred had the leaders exercised restraint and preached peace before the elections. Seeds of animosity had been sown in the minds and hearts of the people such that by the time they were going for elections, hatred and anger was high. This was so especially with the Kalenjin communities in Eldoret. In fact, the respondents who were interviewed claimed that they had received warnings to vacate Eldoret immediately after the elections. They noted that some leaflets had been left within their homes. A number of those who received were from the Kikuyu community. When asked to state the real cause of the animosity, most of them said that the leaders from the Kalenjin community had manipulated the mind of the people by giving them

money and other things. This they did to agitate them against other communities so that they can chase them from Eldoret.

#### 4.3.2 Economic Performance and Competition for Economic Resources

The study found that the catastrophic economic performance of many indigenous communities in Eldoret East district contributed to the 2007 post election violence. The idea of the communities that had settled in the area gaining ground against the natives was a long-term issue that triggered conflicts during the 2007 general election. The long term issue was the national disparity of income distribution problem in Kenya which created economic discomfort that boosted the 2007 PEV. It was observed that the deepest causes of conflict are economic despair which was always coupled with social injustice and political oppression. According to Kenya Human Rights Report (2008), in the midst of poverty, the ruling classes, or the elite group who happen to hold power at a particular time, have enriched themselves and become the targets of envy or of rivalry by other elite groups. Politics is a commercial venture in their view. Conflicts arise not so much out of clashes of ideologies or programs, but for profit – often for just an elite few, for the masses take little part in this part of conflict (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2008). The ethnic violence in Eldoret East district has been nearly tribal or rooted in competition between individuals, for the scarce resources of wealth, state and power. The researcher observed that there were real conflicts between the people of Eldoret East district. In fact, there is a pull towards individualistic ownership at the peril of others. Some people have been using politics as a private hunting ground for more wealth and in causing animosity among the communities that contributed to the 2007 PEV.

In reference to economic performance and competition for economic resources, most conflicts had early emerged due to fight over grazing land, cattle, water points and cultivable land as reflected by the many cases of frequent fights between the Pokots and Marakwets. These conflicts go back a long way, in some cases to the pre-colonial period. Thus, they aggravated major changes which had been introduced in the Kenya's economy such as changes over land laws which often contradict customary laws, confiscation of large tracts of land for ranching and large-scale farming, and increase in population leading into the 2007 PEV. Most important is the rise of rural inequalities – between rich and poor/landless farmers, between rich ranchers and poor cattle owners. These changes have led to a considerable competition for the scarce resources of land (cultivable and grazing, including water). Furthermore, environmental deterioration in land productivity and scarcity of water in Eldoret East district has contributed to the intensity of the competition. Amongst pastoral societies in particular, the system of grazing which involves movement of large herds to water points and in search for pasture, had created a serious problem. Private ownership of land restricted these necessary movements of pastoralist and the impact was serious and catastrophic on pastoralist societies since it led to eruption of ethnic wars, leaving many people injured and some dead.

The settlement of communities in Eldoret East district and other parts of the country caused economic disruption. This disruption which took place caused considerable problems and tensions in almost all the communities. Some of the respondents noted that individual ownership of land, the development of agricultural economy for both internal market and for export through large-scale plantations as well as small-scale farming has inevitably led to shortage of land in fertile areas, economic differentiations, landless peasants and inevitable tension and conflict over land and other resources. The state promoted the escalation of

tension when the 2007 post election violence began and the indigenous community felt it was their right to fight and re-own their ancestral land.

#### **4.3.3 Communal Conflicts**

Communal and mass conflicts were also pointed out as one of the major issues that created about tension towards 2007 post election violence. It was found out that some of the different communities had different perception towards issues relating with legitimacy of specific regimes. Some of the communities felt that their counterparts had been in power for long as well as undermining other communities' territory. Thus, they challenged the state's territorial integrity and protested existing distribution of power. By far, the most prevalent in the post-colonial Africa, communal conflicts seek the promotion of sub-national identities – a goal which can be achieved either through adequate representation, including the protection of minority rights, the granting of autonomy, or through outright secession. Inter-ethnic animosity obviously grows where religion and customs are clearly distinguished among groups (The New York Times, February 22, 2008). In Eldoret East district, churches were burnt down which were believed to be belonging to communities who are not part of the Kalenjin community. Schools of private developers who had settled in the area were also destroyed completely. People took mass action and destroyed property which they knew were not owned by the indigenous communities due to communal conflicts. Most of the respondents of the study revealed that for many years, inequitable decisions have continued to be implemented in the Rift Valley. As a result, ethno-regional began to reassess profitability of continued participation in the political centre, demanding greater representation and when they are not met, begin to conscript the idea of autonomy or separate independence, as a way of assuring their survival and development. Total assessment of Eldoret revealed that the indigenous people were being overtaken by 'immigrants', leading to the 2007 PEV in order to repossess what they had lost.

A fresh phenomenon was cited which has added the intensity and occurrence of conflicts amongst cattle grazing people. Eldoret East and other parts of Rift Valley have had serious rebel movements, which had often raided the pastoralists for cattle in order to sell them for arms or for food. The pastoralists in their turn had to acquire arms to defend themselves. Another phenomenon is the highly organized and extensive cattle stealing from one pastoralist group by another, with automatic weapons often being used. This is because cattle had reduced among some communities posing a considerable demand. For example, the Pokots had been raiding the Kalenjin communities to steal cattle and this has led to subsequent ethnic violence and clashes.

#### **4.3.4 Failure of the Police**

At the core of R2P (Responsibility to Protect) is the commitment to prevent mass atrocity crimes. As part of this commitment, the government had a responsibility to ensure that the police have the capacity to respond to developing threats, observe international human rights standards and do not facilitate the commission of rights violations (Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence, 2008). It was affirmed through this study that in during the 2007 PEV, the police in Eldoret East district and its environs failed to espouse these responsibilities. Respondents reported that some police refused to intervene to protect victims of ethnic attacks, resorted to disproportionate force when they did disperse crowds and sometimes carried out extra-judicial killings. Some sidelined with their communities while other did not take action at all claiming that they were not given any command so they did not know which action to take. Interestingly, as earlier report had indicated that the police reportedly killed one third of the victims who died in the post-election violence, (Commission

of Inquiry into Post Election Violence, 2008) was found true in Eldoret East district. Some of those who had lost their loved ones have blamed the police as the sole killer.

It should be noted that lack of coordination and poor training, combined with divisions within the police command structure, further contributed to the violence in many parts of Kenya. In addition, this is not the first time that the police in Kenya have been implicated in election-related violence. The police also have a history of being used by senior government officials to intimidate opponents. Until the passage of the 2010 Constitution, the Office of the President appointed senior police officials and was able to rely upon them to protect its interests rather than the well-being of the broader Kenyan public (Kenya Human Right Commission, August, 2011).

As a result, many respondents viewed the police as corrupt, ineffective and unable to protect them in accordance to the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project (February, 2013). The belief that the government was unable to ensure the safety and security of ordinary Kenyans, particularly those residing outside of large urban centers, previously contributed to a rise in individuals arming themselves during electoral periods. The study established that in Eldoret East district, there has been laxity in the part of the police in disarming the people and gangs who had been terrorizing people along ethnic lines. They claimed that government arms and other imported ones were used during ethnic violence. For example, AK47 rifles were found with many people. Most people lamented that they were at the mercy of God only since the police could not be trusted any more. Some respondents even noted that the government has been making a dire mistake by posting police into Eldoret East district based on their tribe. Kalenjin police are posted into their original homes and

when issues of violence arise, it becomes hard to report since the causers are tribe-mates to the police.

The respondents noted that lack of security in Eldoret East district was a cause towards 2007 PEV. They argued that in Eldoret in general, conflicts were as a result of lack of security and there is always a psychological fear of political uncertainty since the police force has been taking sides. This explains why there have been attacks even amongst the Kalenjin communities especially over grazing grounds and water while others have been caused by warring communities stealing from one another.

The study findings revealed that there still exists fear of fresh attack, since throughout the region; conflicts have been as a result of consequences of the fear of the future, lived through the past. It has been a collective fear of the future based on a history of social uncertainty, due to the failure of the government to arbitrate justly between or provide credible guarantee of protection for groups, resulting in emerging anarchy and social fractures. The respondents felt that conflicts were caused by fear of anarchy and political uncertainty more than simple competition for resources at deeper levels. In fact, I observed and saw that some of the respondents expressed skepticism and were not willing to give information on the problem which was being investigated because of fear.

#### **4.3.5 Colonial Factors**

The study also discovered that colonial effects and consequences also had a part in the 2007 PEV in Eldoret East district. The eruption of 2007 PEV was a culmination of previous numerous ethnic conflicts and violence. For example, those experienced in 1992 and 1997 in most parts of the country. The tensions and conflicts which developed as a result of the

imposition of political and administrative structures and those which developed as a result of economic processes of the colonial economy. These tensions and conflicts did not simply remain at the structural level; nor were they temporary phenomenon, which were expected to disappear after a brief period. They have translated into values and expectations and stored in long historical memories through a process of in-effective socialization. Both individual and collective memories affect both concealed and manifest behavior, often hostile, towards other groups. And these memories have been exploited on a large-scale during the nationalist period, and presently by political leaders during election periods. This contributed greatly toward the post election violence in 2007. But more significantly, these memories have been the pedestals for the many localized conflicts which took place in both rural and urban areas in Eldoret. In fact, most of these conflicts went on at a low intensity level hence, pass unnoticed, but got noticed when they reached level of violence. Needless to say, these memories were carried over into the post-independence period and put into play during the clashes of 1992, 1997 and 2007.

One major issue associated with colonial factors causing 2007 PEV was land. The problem can be summarized as follows: Kenya became independent in 1963; at the most fertile areas that had been occupied by white settlers were handed over to the new government instead of the people who had lived there before. Besides selling pieces of this land on market terms, Kenyan governments have continuously allocated these areas to shifting supporters for patronage purposes. Moreover, because colonial laws were never fundamentally changed, there are no provisions for collective land rights, thus complicating ownership for communities that have traditionally been pastoralists (Human Rights Watch, 15 October, 2008). The study discovered that, it is the outpouring of old ethnic tensions caused by colonialism that have been simmering underneath the surface and kept in check only by a

strong central government. To others it is the resurfacing of factors that have remained unattended since independence. For example, after independence, a lot of people were left landless, either because their communal land was acquired by former colonialists, forcing the new independent government to respect the creation of "private property" boundaries, or because "alien" ethnic communities, for modern business purposes, started settling in land ancestrally held by other ethnic communities. Other tribes who are not Kalenjins have been invading land in Eldoret East district for the last 30 years while in many cases government authorities have practiced plain illegal allocation and misuse. These colonial injustices and unsettlement of issues piled up animosity in the hearts of people. During the 2007 election, this anger busted out in form of violence.

#### **4.3.6 The Media and Hate Speech**

The media was playing a role towards the eruption of 2007 PEV all over the country. For example, during the 2007 election, a number of radios promoted 'chasing non-members of the community from their homeland'. Hate speech played a crucial role in inciting deadly violence. As the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Communications, Bitange Ndemo, argued, "according to intelligence reports, the political violence that engulfed various parts of the country in 2007 and early 2008 was largely a result of the use of irresponsible and inflammatory language in the run up to and immediate aftermath of the elections" (Ramah, 25 October, 2012).

Local radio stations and other vernacular media bore particular responsibility for inciting violence through broadcasts that included the playing of ethnic war songs. One such station was the Kalenjin radio station, KASS-FM. The Waki Commission found that, "a few days (before) the election KASS-FM announced that there would be rigging and in some of their

open forums encouraged people to use the radio to incite people,” (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence, 2008). Many people spoke on KASS-FM to announce that Kikuyu would be expelled from Rift Valley. One of KASS-FM’s journalists, Joshua Sang, is currently facing crimes against humanity charges before the ICC (Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11).

As found out in the study, respondents implicated all forms of media in creating an atmosphere where animosity and violence were likely by irresponsibly raising tensions between contending ethnic groups. In addition to incitement in the print and broadcast media, SMS text messages urging violence were widely circulated. One such SMS read, “no more innocent Kikuyu blood will be shed. We will slaughter them right here in the capital city. For justice, compile a list of Luos you know,” (Goldstein, 2008). It was shocking to find out that even after seven years have elapsed since the post election violence, one of the respondents was still having text messages in their phones even though the scene cited in the message was in Nairobi. This shows the power of media in either accelerating or decelerating violence.

From the study, the respondents noted that local leaders, TV and radio stations broadcasted hate speech. Local leaders also were blamed over the same. The respondents from both political and tribal divides confirmed that hate speeches from local and national leaders had already piled up animosity and hatred among the communities, and no matter the direction the elections were to take, war was eminent. On this same note, it was found out that vernacular stations fuelled the 2007 post election violence—just a grain. This is true as most respondents confirmed even though those in the media and human rights reacted angrily to this claims after the 2007 PEV, dismissing the claims as another attempt by a heavy-handed and embattled government to curtail freedom of expression, and punish media unsympathetic to its cause.

The propaganda that spread through the radio stations contributed to 2007 post-election violence where ODM supporters evicted PNU supporters from Rift Valley because the radio stations told them to do so. The community radio stations unanimously dictated to the masses in Rift Valley what to do with their PNU sympathizers. The reverse is true of PNU supporters who evicted their ODM supporters and sympathizers from Central, Nairobi and parts of Rift Valley provinces. The respondents of the study further said that the ban on live broadcasting did not help the matter. Following the ban, most community radio stations merely relayed messages broadcast by BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera that showed violence taking place. The foreign media showed real time evictions of burning houses, scarred people on the move and even people hacked to death. When people saw their tribesmen being killed, they retaliated by attacking members of other communities living among them. Some stations relayed such gory stories they fuelled the 2007 post election violence in unexpected places far from the epicenter. This was further argued by some respondents that, such messages also fuelled revenge attacks by reporting the plight of the displaced, and their eventual return to ancestral homes.

In the opinion of respondents the media was the first to bring to public attention the tallying anomalies of presidential votes that led to the current political crisis in Kenya. They also showed live the sharp political divisions and fights at the ECK media centre, where the results were being read. Political bickering and election fraud were played live in Kenyan sitting rooms and public places. On the day of the General Election, the community media scrutinized the performance of election officials. They broke news of late arrival of election officials and ballot papers. They prompted ECK officials to act.

The community radio stations were also the first to report election results because of their proximity to polling stations and knowledge of the ECK officials on the ground. When ECK dragged their feet in releasing results, the community radios filled the gaps through continuous analysis and updates of new results from officials on the ground. Nevertheless, it should be noted that following the eruption of post-election violence, the community radio stations played important roles in promoting peaceful co-existence. For instance, they supported the “Chagua Amani Zuia Noma” campaign. The findings revealed that the community media fuelled the 2007 post-election violence ignored the role played by other mass media such as Internet, mobile phones and satellite communication. They said that overzealous propagandists and bloggers used Internet to disseminate hate messages. Political parties and their sympathizers created websites specifically for political campaign propaganda. Bloggers had a field day posting hate messages and propaganda. Short text messages in ethnic languages were circulated urging members of various communities not to vote for perceived enemies. Kinsmen used SMS messages to discipline and ostracize errant relatives with differing political orientation.

#### **4.3.7 Land**

Struggle for land was a key issue during the 2007 PEV. A number of groups were using the aggravated situation to counter their enemies to have land for farming. It should be observed here that land issue was a long-term conflict that came into play during the 2007 PEV. The manipulation of grievances over land ownership, access and utility remain central drivers of conflict in Kenya for many years. This is due to limited availability of arable land and a tenure system that is consistent with the country’s rising population and the demands of modern agriculture. Violence related to land in Kenya has tended to concentrate in the Rift Valley, often with the Kikuyu ethnic group on the one side and the Kalenjin ethnic group on

the other. However, issues of land have been cropping up in other part of the country including Nakuru, Lamu, Mombasa and Kilgoris among others. Disputes over land ownership are historically related to colonial and post-independent regimes' unfair taking and allocation of land (and the colonialists' forceful resettlement of individuals from certain ethnic groups). Such disputes remain an unsolved problem that political leaders have also used to escalate ethnicity.

In particular, questions related to land distribution and ownership were found central in explaining violence in Eldoret East district during in 2007 PEV. Despite several attempts of reforms, land grievances dating back to the colonial era continue to constitute a major obstacle to peaceful cohabitation in Eldoret East district and in Rift Valley province at large. The respondents pointed out that land was a big issue and every conflict and violence which has ever taken place in Eldoret East district has always been associated with land. They said that all along since independence, the presence of non-Kalenjin communities in the region has been agitating the indigenous people. They feel that Rift Valley belongs to the Kalenjins and the settlers have come in, buying vast land and overtaking them in matters of farming. As much as this increases production, their presence is not welcome wholeheartedly. This explains why some Kalenjins were happy to join the violence since they thought by doing so, the other communities will leave hence occupy the land.

At least two dimensions are relevant when considering land distribution and ownership as a cause of political violence. First, many families can barely make a living from the small piece of land they own currently. As pointed out by one of the Kenyans consulted by the author, 'land is a national cake, and everybody should have at least a small piece. But where some have plenty, most have little' (Human Rights Watch, 15 October, 2008). Shortage and

unequal distribution of land can lead to dissatisfaction with governance and violence may be a means of expressing frustrations. Second, long-lasting problems of land ownership and distribution have created tensions between communities. It was established that in Eldoret East district, some Kikuyus have allegedly acquired land through connections to the political elite. According to the Waki Report (2008), the Kenyans who belong to the Kalenjin ethnic group tend to view the most recent election violence as a result of land injustices.

Generally, land and ethnicity was a key element during the 2007 PEV, since it was an emotive issue in Eldoret East district, be it over crops, grazing rights or sheer cattle rustling. In relation to this, the 1990's and 2000's saw ethnic violence erupting with ferocity and a mind numbing regularity not seen before in the region's 30 years of relatively peaceful independence history. Land was an underlying factor behind much of the organized violence in the Rift Valley, as well as being critical to the more localized ongoing conflicts in Mt Elgon, Eldoret, and Nakuru. In Eldoret specifically, it was found out that since the 1990s certain leaders had exploited grievances over perceived 'historical injustices' and poorly handled settlement schemes for electoral advantage. These grievances are perceived as favoritism and corruption by successive local and national governments in allocation of fertile land, including a refusal to prevent and reverse settlement of outsiders (notably the Kikuyus) in land originally appropriated from the local residents by the colonial authorities. This of course had occurred in a context of rapid population growth in what remained a largely agricultural society. 2007 PEV was thus, a result of a growing concern of the communities in the area over the years that sparked off due during the heated time of 2007 general elections.

#### **4.3.8 Political Incitement**

Furthermore, political incitement was found to be one of the causes of 2007 PEV. However, identifying causes of political involvement in 2007 PEV is a problematic task. Firstly, any attempt to ‘explain’ a phenomenon such as political violence can be subjected to the objection that attempting to establish causal connections to certain economic, social, or political realities is simply the wrong way of approaching political violence. Viewing political violence as an outcome of particular societal features easily gives way to the perception that the emergence of political violence is unavoidable. Nonetheless, the reversed position is also problematic. Mass violence is not simply irrational and unexplainable, and it remains a fact that political violence seems to occur persistently in some countries and not – or to a much smaller extent – in others (Anderson, January, 2008). In any case, some skepticism is justified whenever studies pursue the ‘explanation’ or ‘identification of causes’ of a phenomenon such as political violence. In all forms of violence are said to relate to power, political violence has been defined as ‘the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power’ (Moser and Clark, 2001). It is therefore the pursuit of political objectives (and not the end result of gaining or not gaining political power) that is at the core of the notion (Hibbs Jr, 1997). Defining political violence is typically contingent on a typology that separates the politically motivated from economically and socially motivated forms of violence. In this sense, political violence takes place in the collective sphere where acts of violence are typically committed by a multitude of individuals from one group against individuals from another group, primarily because the targeted individual happens to belong to this group. Political violence typically takes the form of murder, assaults, sexual abuse such as rape, forced pregnancy or sterilization (Moser and Clark, 2001).

During the 2007 PEV, the violence that sporadically erupted in various parts of the Rift Valley, the respondents confirmed that Kalenjins perceived other tribes as posing a grave threat to their ethnic community. They waged war against those that they deemed outsiders, specifically targeting members of the Kikuyu who had bought land and moved into the region. Members of the Luo, Kikuyu, Abagusii and Luhya were also attacked while similar violence occurred in other areas dominated by Kalenjins like Nakuru. In fact, respondents stressed that support and resistance to political leaders in Eldoret East district have often followed ethnic lines. When forming the local government, some political leaders have rewarded and ensured advantages to individuals from supportive ethnic groups, while marginalizing or excluding individuals belonging to ethnic groups associated with political opponents. Supporting this view, the Waki Report (2008) for example, noted how 'Moi rewarded his supporters, particularly the Kalenjin, through appointments to political offices and with jobs in the public service and the military'. The Waki Report (2008) also notes how during the 1980s and 1990s 'land grabbing and the allocation of public land as political patronage were part of the gross corruption of this period'. In this way, the respondents noted that land allocation was often turned into a reward to 'politically correct individuals'.

The respondents cited that in Eldoret, like in many other parts of Kenya, political power had been perceived as vital for obtaining access to public goods, and the distinction between individuals benefitting or marginalized from such access is viewed in ethnic terms. In addition to this, political leaders had always had a personal interest in obtaining power because large-scale corruption had become institutionalized. In a sense, gaining political office had been seen as 'a struggle for survival': if power was obtained, the perception was that access to sparse resources was ensured, and if not; marginalization and exclusion was reckoned to follow. Such acts of struggle have been causing tensions leading to conflicts and

eventually conflicts in most parts of Eldoret region as whole. Another example, was that of an Assistant Minister in the Office of the President who vowed that there would be "endless bloodshed" if a "stupid magistrate" ruled in favor of an opposition petition challenging the election of the head of State. Less than a week after this statement and after the opposition politician took his petition to court, violence broke out, targeting members of the opposition leaders' ethnic group. After spirited lobbying by the opposition and the Churches, the government acted decisively to stop it, but not before over hundreds of lives had been lost and thousands of people left homeless.

This is the ground work in which political will to solve and clean the past history still remains a challenge. Numerous arguments had been noted that there was lack of political will to solve ethnic conflicts that lead to 2007 PEV. For instance, two reports on the ethnic violence had shown clearly that politics had contributed to the 2007 PEV- one of the report was by a parliamentary probe committee and another by the National Council of Churches - recognized that the salient issues of land, ethnicity and economics had not been adequately addressed by successive Kenyan governments. Also, the reports pointed to the cause and effect pattern of incitement by politicians and the eruption of ethnic violence. Speeches at public rallies, ethnic violence thereafter - politicians insecure in their political turf playing the ethnic card to shore up support and to consolidate their personal and party grip on political power and the benefits accrued (Moser and Clark, 2001).

The respondents reported that political incitement had led to eruption of the 2007 PEV in Eldoret East district. Some political leaders come to the rural areas, echo hate speeches and leave while ignorant citizens were left incited by these speeches. Coupled with their ignorance of patriotism and national hood, these citizens attacked their neighbors without

knowing that they were the ones to lose at the end of the day. Such as been the scenarios in Eldoret East district. Countless lives have been lost through violence incited by politicians. Evidence from a wide range of sources and respondents showed that the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district had been preceded by inflammatory speeches by politicians in which they had urged members or particular ethnic groups to take action against other groups which had not supported them during the elections. It was also reported that during the clashes themselves, some local community leaders had incited specific acts of violence. Some of the leaders had been arrested and charged with criminal offences but again released.

#### **4.3.9 Ethno-Political Competition and Discrimination**

In continuance of the assessing the factors that caused the 2007 PEV, it was found out that Ethno-political competition and discrimination was among them. Kenya being a multi-ethnic society and many communities has lived in harmony for many years. In recent years, however, the dominant ethnic groups have been on the forefront in fighting for political power. This situation resulted into fighting to control the power. The relatively less dominant communities have been playing the card of opportunism. Many ethnic groups supported the armed struggle for independence in hope that they could regain their stolen lands. This expectation did not become reality. The situation has fomented anger, resentment, lust for revenge, and aggressive competitiveness that has overlooked the common good of the entire country. Frustration among the poor, both in urban and rural areas, has created a growing tendency to use violence as a viable means to correct the situation. When violent reactions emerge, under the influence of ethno-political ideologies, tend to take the form of ethnocentrism, the ideology that animates the competition between ethnic groups (Tarimo, 2015).

From the study, it was found out that many respondents were full of resentment because the property they had lost during ethnic violence that has hit Eldoret East district. Some had even lost their loved ones and their hearts were full of hatred especially respondents from communities who were not Kalenjins. On the other hand, some Kalenjins who were interviewed were also full of anger since they felt that their resources had been taken by other communities. Around five respondents were frank to reveal that their community had engaged in violence with hope that the immigrant communities will leave Eldoret East so that they inhabit the land and take possession of other resources. Hatred and anger was still in their heart since this did not materialize. They now claimed that their leaders lied to them. Some regretted having participated in violence and they never gained anything.

In relation to the forgoing, Tarimo (February, 2015) notes that Ethno-political competition, which has been alive since independence, has finally degenerated into ethno-political competition, discrimination, and violence. Ever since the flawed election triggered a wave of ethno-political violence many people have been violently driven from their homes and many are now resettling in ethnically homogenous zones. Even some of the packed slums in certain cities have split along ethnic lines. Ethnic demarcation and regionalism, as promoted by ethnic leaders, revolve around the practice of ethnic discrimination. The phenomenon of ethnic discrimination comes into play when each region is identified with a certain ethnic group, and whenever political misunderstandings emerge those who are identified as foreigners are always forced to go to their ancestral land (Gettleman, December, 2008).

#### **4.3.10 Negative Stereotyping**

Absence of efforts to debunk negative perceptions and ethnic stereotypes in Kenya was among the cause of 2007 PEV. There existed ethnic tension that led to bloodshed and

displacements of Kenyans for many years. The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report states that, for a long time ethnic stereotyping had not only been used on the political arena to discredit politicians from other communities, but it has also fuelled targeted and barbaric forms of violence against members of such communities. Such violence was meted out especially during the 2007 PEV. This has seen labels been put on certain communities, portraying them in broad, often negative terms that generalize certain traits and apply them to all individuals belonging to the described community, regardless of how individuals perceive themselves (Parties to the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation March, 2008).

According to TJRC there have been negative attitudes towards individuals and social groups. For example, there has been a kind of perception about the pastoralists like the Pokot, Turkana as always being primitive. The Kikuyu on the other hand are seen as land grabbers and perceived as thieves while Luhya and the Kamba are at times referred to as liars and at times as very loyal. The Luos have been said to be proud while those in coast were deemed lazy people. It is a problem of perceptions, myths and stereotypes about each other. However, nobody has tried to debunk this hence people continue to grow in various communities who have been told that other communities behave in a certain way without taking time to find out if it is true. The report further argues that most of the negative perceptions and stereotypes that are present today in Kenya were initially propagated by the colonial government. Besides employing the 'divide and rule' tactic, the colonialist government also perpetuated ethnic stereotyping. (Parties to the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation March, 2008).

It further fault the colonial government's response to the Mau Mau rebellion included perpetuating stereotypes and dividing Kenyans based upon ethnicity. For example, the colonial government hired large numbers of Luo to work on white farms to replace the

'untrustworthy' Kikuyu and included disproportionately large numbers of the Kamba community in the army (Parties to the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation March, 2008). However, this has not come without an expense as ethnic stereotyping has been extremely damaging to ethnic relations in Kenya. Indeed, some ethnic groups partly attribute their historical economic marginalization to stereotypes that have all along been perpetuated about them. There is evidence that President Moi's administration took a page from the colonial government and used divide and rule tactics to pit ethnic communities against each other. This policy became particularly evident after the re-introduction of multi-party politics in the country in the early 1990s. The introduction of multiparty politics and elections coincided with a wave of ethnic violence in parts of the country. Such issues found culmination during the 2007 general election which triggered the 2007 PEV.

The respondents of the study cited communities who had invaded Eldoret region, and pointed out that Kalenjins were looked at as somehow sleeping people and lazy and that is why they have been selling their land. On the other hand, the Kalenjins have been viewing the immigrants as thieves of their land. This kind of stereotyping along ethnic lines has been string hatred among the communities and most of the hate speeches experienced during the PEV were a result of stereotyping.

#### **4.3.11 Government Complicity in Communal Violence**

This is attributed to the government official who uses their office to promote ethnic violence through social acts. Once again this was a long term issues that calumniated during the 2007 PEV. During President Moi's era, in the 1990s commercialized cattle rustling and other ethnic attacks for land and pasture in many parts of the Rift Valley were linked to high-ranking government officials. In the study, it was found out that the Kenyan government

sometimes provides arms to local allies who were given license, sometimes with direct support from the police, to attack rivals. Several incidents were reported and when such occurred, the police were reluctant to intervene since they were the cause. Views from respondents also indicated that that some victims did not go to the police because they feared reprisals from those committing the violence or abuse at the hands of the police. Some victims said that when they attempted to report to the police, but they were asked for money, or were threatened with being implicated in some of the crimes they had witnessed. According to the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (2008), the police were responsible for 405 of the 1,113 death in the entire country. But remember these were only the documented figures but many atrocities were committed and they were never recorded.

#### Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion, it is disheartening to note that with multiparty politics, which started in 1992, selfish politicians and the political elite used the kind of diversity in multi-ethnicity to balkanize the people of Eldoret and plunge them into violence, culminating into the kind of political crisis that was witnessed in late 2007 right through to early 2008. This kind of negative ethnicity, which was overtly exhibited in hate speeches, took centre stage in the voting patterns that were witnessed in the 2007 general elections. Today, most people in Eldoret East district and Kenya at large know themselves as belonging to this ethnic community and not “the other”. The whole issue of “Them” vs. “Us”, or the politics of inclusion and exclusion has now unfortunately become more pronounced and magnified, and even in urban centers, most people now identify themselves first as belonging to a specific “tribal” community before looking at themselves as Kenyans. The whole idea of national identity has been relegated to the rear as ethnic identity takes centre stage (Yieke, 2010)

Violence during electoral periods in Kenya has killed at least 4,433 people and displaced over 1.8 million since the introduction of the multi-party system in 1991(Human Rights Watch, October 2008). The 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district was as a result of a combination of factors, including politicization of ethnicity, colonial factors, corruption, non-adherence to the rule of law, a centralized and highly personalized form of governance, inequitable development, police failure, land scarcity, and a “winner-takes-all” form of politics perceived as benefiting one ethnic constituency to the detriment of all others. Only the 2002 and 2013 elections have not been seriously marred by violence.

Other factors related to the clashes such as food insecurity, labour disruption on farms, industry and the public sector institutions, destruction of property, land grabbing, commercial disruption, breakdown in transport and communication, resource diversion, mis-allocation and unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices, and environmental destruction.

#### **4.4: Effects of the 2007 Post Election Violence**

The eruption of 2007 PEV as was discussed in the previous section was caused by myriad of factors. Subsequently, 2007 PEV had adverse effects on people, property, animals, environment and the economy. Even though the violence had some positive effects, negative effects were far much overwhelming. This section discussed the main negative and positive effects of the 2007 PEV with reference to Eldoret East District.


##### **4.4.1 Negative Effects**

The 2007 post election violence brought about huge damage to the people, animals, environment as well as property in Eldoret East district. Following the announcement of the results of the December 2007 National General Elections, violent skirmishes and riots

erupted in Eldoret East district and many other parts of the country that also involved destruction of both private and public property.

#### 4.4.1.1 Loss of Human Life

During the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East, thousands of persons lost their lives. In fact, there was an incident in which especially children and women were burnt in a church in Eldoret. The respondents lamented that six years ago during election-related violence in Kenya, young people brutally attacked and burned a church in Kiambaa - which housed ethnic Kikuyus who fled from their farms and houses. During the time of this study, memories were still fresh among the victims. The church burning was part of a wave of violence generally pitting Kikuyus, who are believed to have dominated Kenyan politics since the country won independence from Britain in 1963, against Odinga's ethnic group, the Luo, and other tribes who sided with him to oust what they considered entrenched Kikuyu power.



*Figure 1: Aerial footage of the area where a church was attacked near Eldoret, northwest of Nairobi, Kenya. About 50 villagers mainly of Kikuyu origin were cowering inside. (Source-Reuters TV).*

The perceived importance of human life makes it imperative to consider the scale of violence in terms of the number of human death. The holocaust was so devastating, and thus an emotive debate because of the number of deaths incidental to it.

#### **4.4.1.2 Destruction of Property**

Damage to property comes second, and so we get the analysis of economic loss. Kenya lost property worth billions of shillings as a result of post election violence. Kipkelion for instance, the crop destruction was record breaking. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (2008) puts figures at "36, 566 bags of maize, 8,100 bags of beans, 800 bags of Irish potatoes, 40 tones of cabbages, 30 tonnes of kales, 20 hectares of sugarcane and 3,219 plants of coffee".

In Eldoret town and its surrounding regions including Nandi, Marakweti, Pokot, Mt. Kenya, Kitale among others, motor vehicles, farm products, shops, infrastructure, etc were razed down by rowdy citizens, who were crying for justice. Members from both political divides claimed that they were fighting for their rights. Most of respondents who participated in this study from non-Kalenjin communities said that most of their property was destroyed unselectively and in-discriminatively. Their trees were cut down crops were destroyed, vehicles were burnt, houses were reduced to ashes, the road network was destroyed, and even the railway line was undone in some places. I came across one respondent whose three vehicles were burnt down while another his schools was torched down to ashes completely. Some respondents who were in church during the 2007 PEV and the study too said that the loss they incurred will take a lifetime to regain back. They were living in poor conditions. Meeting their daily needs including adequate food, clothing, shelter, water, medical facilities and catering for the education of their children is a nightmare. They recalled those days before the 2007 PEV where they said life was good and comfortable. Their permanent

houses were pulled down, iron sheets stolen alongside other valuables and even their livestock and poultry was taken away. Wealth which they had taken years to accumulate was reduced to nothing in just a few days.

#### **4.4.1.3 Reduction in Productivity**

The political crisis that prevailed in the country did not only cause loss of human lives, livelihoods and properties, it also had significant impacts on the operations of many public and private sector institutions. The magnitude of the impacts may have been varied from institution to institution and from place to place. Nevertheless, the impacts reversed many gains that the country had made since independence. Various sectors were negatively affected. Water sector, for instance was affected in four main areas namely: Operations, equipment and physical facilities; Staff and their dependants; challenge in the provision of water to the IDPs. The impact was equally felt in agricultural sector. The impact was also greatly felt in tourism sector. In general the entire economy of the country was affected and further worsened by global recession (Onyango, February 14, 2008).

In Eldoret East district, the effect was felt greatly. Many settlers who had invested especially in farming were forced to close up their industries and farms and leave. This means that many people especially the youths were left jobless without any source of livelihood. Along the same line, many farming land was left desolate for so long without cultivation. By the time of the study, the researcher saw vast land uncultivated and was used only for grazing. This land was initially planted with crops before the 2007 PEV. There was a general decline in economic production as many of the potential farmers ran away due to insecurity created by the violence. In a state of insecurity, as was the case in the study area, agricultural activities were disrupted. In most cases, maize, coffee, pyrethrum, tea, sugarcane and other crops were

either destroyed or abandoned because of the widespread violence caused by the clashes. In some areas, work on agricultural land stopped for a long time as farm workers stayed away for fear of being attacked by the clashing enemies. In fact, it was found out during the study that some respondents were staying in rental houses and had engaged in small business as an alternative for farming. These respondents were living in pathetic conditions since their income was little.

#### **4.4.1.4 Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV)**

This was employed as a tool of intimidation, with reports of the threat of rape being used to chase women from their homes. Other cases of SGBV appear to have been opportunistic, perpetrated by gangs of youth in slums or targeted at women fleeing violence. Cases of ethnically motivated forced circumcision of males from mostly the Luo community were documented in Eldoret East and other parts of the country like Nakuru and Naivasha. However, the number of cases suggests that circumcision was sporadic rather than an overall trend in the violence. However, violence heightened it and people used it in causing terror and harassment along ethnic lines.

The clashes in Eldoret brought about a situation of gender and child vulnerability as with the case of Kiambaa church where almost all the 50 victims who were burned to death were women and children. Indeed, it is the children and women who suffered more during the period of the clashes. They were abused, violated, embarrassed and at times raped in broad daylight during the clashes. During the study, I came across one woman who lamented on how her daughter was raped in her presence. Another family too lamented seeing a whole

family of mother and three children mutilated since they were too weak to run away from the reach of the attackers.

Additionally, the respondents who experienced the 2007 PEV further recalled some experiences during those days citing that in the internal refugee camps, there were inadequate rooms to accommodate thousands of the displaced families. The situation was horrible! Both men and women, together with children, were forced to share the often congested sleeping places in close proximity with one another with little or no privacy. Nature being what it is, there was uncontrolled, indiscriminate sexual behavior, not only between adult men and women, but also involving sex abuse of young children, particularly girls. Some medical professionals who were part of the respondents and who had have been working in Eldoret East district for more than ten years said that, as a result of such immoral practices, sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS were passed from one individual to another, with children and women being the most affected victims of the circumstances.

The study established that the 2007 post election violence brought about assault of women, killings and theft. These interfered especially with children. One respondent estimated that over 500 children displaced were not going to school because their homes and schools were destroyed and some torched. They were trying to learn and cope with the extreme situation in the refugee camps while other victims for sexual violence were still living in bad situation especially those who contracted HIV/AIDS during the violence.

#### **4.4.1.5 Injuries**

During the 2007 PEV, injuries were also inflicted during the violence. A report by Kenya Human Right Commission (2008) confirmed that injuries were experienced during the 2007

post election violence. The respondents said that there was no communication during the 2007 PEV and movement from one place to another was not possible. Many people nursed their injuries in homes since they could not access hospitals. These injuries were never recorded. In fact, some even claimed that there were hundreds of deaths which were executed by both police and people but were never recorded.

The causes of these injuries, just like the causes of deaths, are varied. Some were as a result of gun shots, sharp objects, and traumatic circumcision. The respondents of the study noted that the massive casualties were as a result of citizen against citizen and police' brutalities along ethnic lines. From the study, many respondents seemed to concur with the view that this was a golden opportunity Kenyans got to sort them out, as issues of historical injustices had never found an opportunity to be addressed. The inquiries that were commissioned incidental to the 2007 post election violence came up with startling revelations, of which the citizens are keenly following. It is regrettable that the violence happened as respondents affirmed, but it is encouraging that Kenyans are now aware that impunity is an adversary to justice and good governance in any democratic system.



#### **4.4.1.6 Displacement of People**

The violence led to widespread displacement. As of 27 February 2008, Kenya Human Right Commission (2008) noted that there were many IDPs in organized sites, whilst a similar number of displaced were living in host communities. Some of the respondents, who participated in the study, had been displaced from their original homes where they lived before the 2007 PEV. They had now settled near towns where they felt that security was at least fair. Respondents moreover said that many people from non-Kalenjin communities had left Eldoret and returned to their ancestral homes since they lost all they had. The experience

they went through could not allow them continue staying in Eldoret East district. During the 2007 PEV, there was massive exodus of people from the rural areas to towns. Many people left the rural areas of Eldoret and moved to Eldoret town while others went to Kitale town. Those who moved are now living in rented houses and this comprises the majority number. For those who were rich, they bought plots in towns and constructed and they are living there now.

For the Kalenjin communities, the movement was reverse. Some people from this group bought the land which was being sold by the departing communities. They thus resettled in the rural areas where they are now farming. Others who were living and farming in leased farms were displaced completely and having lost all they had in terms of crops and animals, they had to move either to their ancestral home or into towns to begin a completely different life all together.

they had to move either to their ancestral home or into towns to begin a completely different life all together.



*Figure 2 above shows shelters made of plastic materials for the IDPs in Eldoret East District*

#### **4.4.1.7 Alteration of Land Tenure System**

According to this study, one of the long term economic consequences of the clashes unearthed was the fact that land ownership patterns have been permanently altered. During the 2007 PEV, many houses were torched down and their owners were forced to leave Eldoret. There was massive exodus of non-Kalenjin communities to their ancestral homes. Many were forced to sell their land to the locals. Because of the economic situation by then, it was hard to find one potential buyer. So, people were forced to subdivide their estates into smaller portions before selling them out. This led to land fragmentation. Vast farming lands which once existed in Eldoret East are no longer there. Only a few farms can be seen running in tens of hectares.

For the respondents who were visited, most of them had between one hectare and five. They said that before the 2007 PEV, people used to own more than ten hectares of land but the fear of fresh violence has forced them to sell part of their land and invest in business and in buying land in their original home. This implies that fear of fresh attack still abides in their mind. For those who were in remote places, they either abandoned their land or sold it out. In fact, most respondents affirmed that they sold their land and now they lease land to carry out farming. In other places, the government bought vast land from people and subdivided among the displaced people who were living in IDPs camps. Generally, there was large scale subdivision of land, leasing, resettlement and relocation and this led to purely different kind of land tenure system.

#### **4.4.1.8 Food Shortage**

Food shortage was one of the far reaching economic consequences of the clashes in the study areas. Respondents said that there was a high drop in food production, food supply and raw materials for the agro-based industries such as sugar, tea, coffee, and cereals. As a result of food shortages, many clashes victims experienced famine and this necessitated the appeal for local and international food aid and relief.

#### **4.4.1.9 Health Related Problems**

As found out from the study, the first-hand accounts as given by respondents who experienced the clashes, victims in the affected areas were extremely disturbing as far as health was concerned. The thousands of displaced families, having lost their shelters and food supplies, had to camp in over-crowded temporary shelters organized through donations and support from various organizations, such as the Catholic Mission, Red Cross, NCCCK, Action-Aid Kenya and the UNDP among others. These camps were established haphazardly all over the clashes zones and had poor ventilation. The grossly inadequate water supply and sanitation facilities, coupled with overcrowding, made these camps ideal conditions for major outbreaks of communicable diseases such as meningitis, typhoid, upper respiratory tract infections, cholera and other related diseases. The mixing of people with cattle, sheep, chicken, goats and other domestic animals was in itself a health hazard.

More so, a good number of Kenyans who had HIV had lived with hope with the introduction of anti-retroviral drugs and therapy, however, the IDP situation made them loss hope. There are currently very many Kenyans living with HIV, who are in refugee camps (Nangulu July, 2007). During the 2007 PEV, some fled from their home to other places in fear of attacks. The study found out that a good number of people living with HIV virus were living in these

camps and had lost contact with their HIV patient support centers. At these centers they were getting drugs and counseling. The situation led to relapse on drug adherence and could lead to more deaths or secondary infection out of trauma and loss of hope. Positive clients who were at home were also unable to access hospitals since the roads were insecure or they lacked economic power to pay for transport. In reality, the researcher came across people living with HIV/AIDS who were in pathetic conditions and could not access medical attention at all.

#### **4.4.1.10 Effects on Schools**

In all the districts within our study areas, there was a mass exodus of non-Kalenjin teachers who feared for their lives while teaching in the Eldoret district since this region was hostile to them. Since then, many schools have had to do without the services of experienced teaching staff and the effect of this problem on the performance of examination classes was very serious. The clashes prevented some of the primary and secondary school graduates from continuing with higher education and training because of financial constraints caused by the menace. Apart from the pupils losing their text and exercise books and uniforms, they often went hungry and often fell sick because of food insecurity and poor living conditions in the makeshift camps and schools.

According to some of the teachers who were interviewed, as a result of the clashes in Eldoret East district, many schools did not re-open for the new term because of insecurity after the 2007 PEV. It was also established that displacement affected learning and examination performance by mainly with overcrowding of classrooms causing a shortage in learning materials. The teacher respondents indicated that there was high level of overcrowding especially between standard one and four. The teachers said that this was because the children were small in size and it was easier for them to squeeze in a smaller place while the

bigger ones required their own desks. On the same note, some teachers indicated that displacement also led to pupils missing school for long periods of time causing inadequate content coverage and poor examination preparation.

It was stressed that loss of family members affected classroom learning and performance in examinations. Pupils were many times traumatized because they had witnessed a lot of violence. Trauma interfered with the teaching and learning and hence performance in examinations. The respondents further indicated that the loss of family property led to financial difficulties among other things. The pupils were left without their basic necessities and hence fared poorly in the classroom. The respondents said that displacement due to the post election violence disrupted learning as the pupils had to change schools to safer areas. Joining new schools abruptly also caused overcrowding in the classrooms and interfering with the pupil: ratio. The pupils also missed out on school time because of the displacement and thus missed out on the content that was taught while they were away. Catching up was difficult and could have affected the preparation and handling of the KCPE examinations.

The findings also revealed that families lost their property and hence their source of livelihood. It resulted in difficulties in providing for the basic needs of their children as well as the learning materials. With lack of essentials, it was hard for the pupils to do their best in their class work as well as examinations. The experiences of loosing family members during the violence traumatized many children and interfered with their learning process. The study also found that resettlement gave the pupils a sense of security as they had a permanent shelter. However, for most of the families the financial problems were still there as most of the parents' and care givers' efforts to pick up in small businesses were not so fruitful. The levels of poverty in the camp are still very high up to date

implying that getting the basic needs is still a problem. Even though the general KCPE performance has been on the increase for the last two years due to pupils' determination to learn despite the obstacles, the success is not worth celebrating.

#### **4.4.1.11 Environmental consequences**

The 2007 PEV had also effects on the environment. Large areas of forest land were set on fire as part of a defensive strategy taken by victims of the clashes, to deny their attackers hiding grounds. This development in the long run leads to catastrophic effects on the environment of these areas. In fact, these areas are some of the densely forested zones in Kenya and some are important rain catchments areas. The consequence of massive destruction of forests as was witnessed during the clashes in the mentioned areas would therefore affect the pattern and intensity of rainfall and subsequently affect the viability of rain-fed agriculture and water supply in these zones.

For instance, Mt. Elgon is the major source of perennial rivers such as Kuywa and Kibisi, which flows into Nzoia River that draws into Lake Victoria. Any effect, therefore, on the Mt. Elgon water catchment area will have negative consequences on Lake Victoria and its surrounding.

#### **4.4.1.12 Fear of Fresh Ethnic Violence**

It is true that fighting has subsided from its peak immediately after the elections in mid 2008. However, there are always conflicts here and there manifested in forms of murder of individuals, stealing of cattle between communities, grumbling of land and other natural resources like pasture. From the study, it was established that tension still remains high between political opponents divided along ethnic lines. Residents in Eldoret East district are concerned that some families displaced by the conflict have been unable to return to their

homes simply because many people's homes were burned down and they fear that the same me happen again.

Those who lost their property and loved ones still feel bad over the loss and the spirit of revenge abounds in their hearts. Through discussion with some of them, it was revealed that the memory of the loss was still fresh in their minds. They talked as if the 2007 PEV happened just the other day. It will require much effort to wash the brains of the people from the incidents of 2007 PEV.

#### **4.4.2 Positive Effects**

Although the study as pointed out in depth the negative effects of 2007 PEV, it is clear that there are some few benefits out of it. This could be either on lessons learned or policy implications that could be made. For instance, some respondents who did not cherish animosity but value development, peace and reconciliation felt that the 2007 PEV violence should have been considered positively. Some of the respondents noted out saying 'It should not be regrettable, but be looked at as an opportunity for the political, social and economic system to be reconsidered.' To them, it happened so that Kenyans could in order to learn and avoid such bloodshed and conflicts.

The 2007 PEV provided a platform for the problems that have bedeviled the country since independence should to be addressed following the recommendations made by both the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence and the Independent Review Commission, which concentrated more on the security system, and the electoral body, among other institutions. Since the violence, Kenya has established a firm structural foundation, which was laid on a new constitutional dispensation. A strong chief executive, whose authority is derived from the constitution, was formed, the current system of power sharing

was done away with and at the moment, much of the authority and severity of the country is in the hands of the people. The issue of government being weak and ineffective is now checked by the county governments. No institution is usurping the powers of the other, may it be parliament, judiciary or the executive, thus creating clear boundaries in leadership. A minister now can be taken to court by a common citizen, election fraud can be petitioned, and incompetent government workers are sent home each day among other changes. The land issue which has been a cause of conflicts for so long is slowly being addressed, and the policy on nationalization of land is openly debated. The study concluded that this irony for many Kenyans being squatters in their own country would soon be history if only corruption would be tackled since other institution mechanisms were at

## CHAPTER FIVE

### RESPONSE OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH TO 2007 PEV

#### 5.1 Introduction

The general aim here was to assess the response of the church to 2007 PEV in Eldoret East district. Eldoret region which had for a long time been seen as an oasis of stability in a volatile region is being held hostage by a political class. Many citizens were filled with fear, shame and anguish, as well as fortitude to salvage their region's fortunes and future. The religious leaders, churches, civil society, the media and the international community as well as the all political parties and government had made urgent calls for restraint, peace, rule of law and respect for human rights.

#### 5.2 Positive Response of the Seventh Day Adventist Church to 2007 PEV

In responding to 2007 PEV, the ecumenical role could not be underscored enough in the entire democratic process. The Church was not only considered to be the voice of the voiceless, but also the voice for peace especially during such potentially violent processes as was experienced in Kenya during the 2007 post election violence. The church played a critical role because when it spoke, people listened and followed. The study therefore endeavored to find out the response of the SDA Church to the 2007 PEV. Romero,(2008) Archbishop of San Salvador, had this to say:

The need today is for Christians who are active and critical, who don't accept situations without analyzing them inwardly and deeply. We no longer want masses of people like those who have been trifled with for so long. We want persons like fruitful fig trees, who can say yes to justice and no to injustice and can make use of the precious gift of life, regardless of the circumstances.

It is the responsibility of the church and each Christian to take his or her beliefs and values into the public arena and apply them to the important social issues of the day. This is a significant part of kingdom work. Part of our responsibility as Christians is to exercise compassion and love for others in tangible ways and refrain from all forms of activities that harm fellow human beings, property and even the environment like violence. Christians should feed the hungry, comfort the sorrowing, visit the sick, preach peace and break up barriers that bring the spirit of conflicts and violence. As part of their kingdom service, Christian plumbers plumb since there will not be any leaks in the kingdom. In kingdom service, Christian teachers teach in the sure hope that while now we see darkly, one day we will see face to face, and in that day there won't be any ignorance. As kingdom workers, Christian truckers truck because in the kingdom the good things God has created need to be distributed far and wide.

Also, individual Christians can singly, or through Christian organizations, address the government for solutions to problems that are within the societies like conflicts and violence and the government's proper sphere. One of the simplest ways to carry out this responsibility is to vote for those persons whom people believe will address the problems of the day effectively. This should be done in peace at all times. Working through Christian organizations and churches, Christians can influence government policies for the good in matters of electoral processes. Christians are called to be responsible, compassionate, law-abiding citizens as to avoid conflicts and violence and even help deter other who want to sow seeds of dissension.

Since violence disrupts communities and politics is an instrument for protecting the needs of a society, the church has a role to play in the achievements of the people's needs. The

'Manifesto' Jesus presented at the beginning of his ministry at Nazareth has a socio-political tone (Luke 4: 18-19). Liberation theologians propose that "religion must be able to inform politics without taking it over into itself". That's why the Church had a role of bringing peace. Jesus said, "Peace be with you; as the father sent me, so I send you," (John 20:21). The church is on a mission to bring peace to the world. The church as a sacrament has the language of peace, reconciliation and anticipation of God's Kingdom. The church, therefore, has to preach the message of reconciliation in the political arena. Jesus is a mediator between God and humanity. He came to bring peace between the two conflicting parties. The church as the body of Christ (I Cor.12.27) has to continue the work of Christ.

It has to be noted that reconciliation is a process of give-and-take. It is a celebration of love and unity where both groups have to sacrifice a certain position of their interest. It should also be noted that it cannot be brought to the conflicting parties, but it can only be facilitated by a third party. Bloodfield, et al, (1998), state that in managing conflict there should be foresighted leaders at the negotiation table who are not emotional and who are willing to have peace. The presumption is that peace and reconciliation can only be attempted when the conflicting parties are willing. The church can come with the message of forgiveness (Eph 4:31-32). This forgiveness has to be reciprocal.

### **5.2.1 Preaching Peace and Solidarity**

In the 2007 poll, churches through NCKK urged leaders like Mr. Kibaki and his rivals to respect the results of the balloting. Specifically, the SDA Church's influential role was meant that politicians looked to it to score political points, for instance candidates could speak before congregations. In addition to this, the Church joined several domestic and international

observers to observe the electoral process. Kenya's religious leaders played an important role prior to the elections, particularly urging followers to vote and refrain from violence.

### **5.2.2 Emergency Response**

When violence broke out at the beginning of the year, hundreds of thousands of people went into internally displaced persons camps. They required emergency supplies support. Later in March, the IDP camps experienced a new influx as people fleeing their homes due to increasing political tensions when there were delays in the formation of the cabinet. Apart from the Internally Displaced Persons, there were very many Kenyans living in arid and semi-arid areas who, during this period, required food assistance.

### **5.2.3 Provision of Food and Non Food Items**

In partnership with the Lutheran World Federation, the Council in Western region distributed bags of maize and bags of beans at the Turbo camp and among the displaced persons in Teso district. Household kits were received and distributed at the IDP centers in Sirisia and Chebkai. Churches in other regions donated food to the displaced persons in Coast and Central regions (Ochieng March-April, 2007).

With assistance from Terres des Hommes and the churches, the Council in the Rift Valley assisted many affected persons. Some were provided with medical supplies whereas some especially children were served with trauma healing services during the period (Ochieng March-April, 2007).

#### **5.2.4 Carrying out Need Assessment**

The study discovered that the church leaders together with other actors participated in various visits to the areas affected by the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district. However, not all the affected individuals were visited. The visits were aimed at creating an environment that would enable the displaced persons to return to their homes even though they were not elaborate. It also gave the actors opportunities to receive firsthand information on the peace situation in these areas thereby enabling them to shape their initiatives appropriately. Since the IDPs and the home communities participated in these visits, they expressed their fears and concerns to each other and also to the government officials present. Apart from these visits, the church participated in community psychosocial assessments done in collaboration with other agencies Eldoret East district which is one of the four regions that were most affected by the violence.

The respondents of the study affirmed that through the visits, the church through its members and leaders was able to help various 2007 PEV victims. The church in general achieved the following:

- It provided anti-retroviral drugs to some of the HIV positive victims who were in the IDPs and in homes
- It provided reproductive health information especially to the youth who are out of school
- Members of the church were taught about HIV and AIDS especially on caring for themselves and those who are infected and affected
- The church addressed issues of stigma and discrimination which were rampant among the people in IDPs and those who had been displaced

- Group therapy meetings were conducted for persons living with HIV and AIDS. This led to increased hope and optimism as they collectively shared and encouraged one another in their daily lives.
- Some persons living with HIV and AIDS were empowered economically through establishment of income-generating activities
- The Churches through the local leaders showed some considerable support to several humanitarian projects by giving venues of meetings, providing overall leadership at the community level, and helping in the mobilization of the congregation to participate in the activities. This action has particularly boosted the impact of the activities carried out and the sustainability of the project.

#### **5.2.5 Pastoral Visits**

Eldoret East district and its environs were among the most affected areas by the post election violence of 2007. In this regard, solidarity visits of the top Church leadership to these affected communities did not only begin a process of healing and reconciliation, but also helped show solidarity with the churches and affected areas. In my observation, most of the 2007 PEV victims appreciated the pastoral visits done during that period even though not all the affected people were reached.

#### **5.2.6 Negotiating between warring tribes**

Respondents affirmed that the church has been playing an important role in the peace-building work in Eldoret East. It has negotiated with both tribes in advance and cleared the way for higher peace talks. It also cooperates with influential leaders in the area who play a key role in achieving peace. There were similar attempts to organize similar peace meetings before the 2007 PEV, but they failed either due to the lack of participants or general distrust.

But after the 2007 PEV, the turn up has been good. The church has been supporting the government to gather the participants and at the same time, it has worked as a technical support for the mediation.

### **5.3 Negative Responses**

In the run up to the 2007 General Election, the church was seen as being openly partisan, along ethnic lines. Christian believers were clearly confused by conflicting “prophesies” of prominent Christian leaders which predicted victory for various candidates and prayed and anointed them as God’s choice for President. The uncertainty generated by these conflicting views fuelled the divisions in the Church (Romero May 10<sup>th</sup> 2008).

Reports from the respondents indicated the church leaders used civic education, prayer meetings and other occasions to openly campaign for their preferred parties and candidates. When asked to comment on the role of the church after the 2007 PEV, some of the respondents said they saw the church took sides with either of PNU or ODM depending on the occasion and place. The church of Christ was not seen playing any role.

Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that when the political crisis erupted leading to widespread violence in the wake of the disputed presidential election results, the Church struggled to find its voice. Church leaders could not rise above their partisanship and give the country a clear moral direction and the church was reduced to a helpless spectator to the emerging tragic drama.

The burning of over 400 churches during the violence was a sad reminder that many had come to regard churches not as sacred and neutral places of worship and sanctuary, but as part of the contested terrain of partisan politics. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, the overwhelming impression was that Christians had been betrayed by their own brothers and sisters and their own leaders.

It is clear that the SDA Church plays a critical role in politics in any country, especially in the creating and furtherance of both positive and negative ideology, particularly in Africa now. In The Kenyan context, the church lost credibility as it was perceived not to be on the side of justice. Similarly in Eldoret East district, there was a general feeling that the church took clear sides either along party or ethnic lines. This resulted in fragmentation within the church and a loss of its credibility amongst the population.

The study established that some Church leaders were influential by subtly advocating their candidates of choice, and in some instances coming out with straightforward endorsements. This move in many ways compromised the perception of neutrality of religious leaders and religious bodies that should have been embodied, further entrenching the already clear divisions in Eldoret East district. On a positive note, the church organized a prayer breakfast for political party leaders to promote a peaceful, fair and secure electoral process which resulted in the political parties signing a peace charter. However, politicians used the same platform to incite citizens. It has been a tradition in Kenya for politicians to go to churches on Sundays and Saturdays and use the forum to propagate their opinions. They do this since they know they can get large masses in churches.

The announcement and subsequent swearing in of Mwai Kibaki, after the 2007 elections, sparked immediate protests that resulted in the death, brutal attacks and destruction of property amongst communities especially those in the opposition strongholds as outlined in the background. Respondents felt that SDA Church leaders saw their communities suffering this unforeseen violence, loss of hope and deepening hatred along ethnic and political party lines of the population. However, churches did not categorically speak with one voice, which should have otherwise encouraged justice, peace and integrity. Many leaders were equally

traumatized, dejected, alarmed and uncertain about the next steps of this shattering political and humanitarian crisis.

The study established that in January 2008, when Kenya was falling apart and looking for moral leadership, the SDA Church lurched and could not give a clear course of action. The peace agreement signed between the politicians in February gave them some breathing space, but the root causes that led to the crisis were far from resolved. The SDA Church failed to take advantage of the experiences of previous violence in Eldoret and of the ceasefire to get its own house in order so that in the event of a future flare-up, it is able to speak with authority and to continue leading the country along the treacherous path to healing and true reconciliation.

Another avenue through which the church failed was in land reform. The unequal distribution of land lies at the heart of Kenya's political problems. It was unearthed that the church was one of the institutions which were derailing the push for more equitable land policies to ensure that this perpetual threat to national stability is dealt with once and for all. Respondents said that the church has been reluctant to challenge the status quo in land distribution. Respondents affirmed that mainstream churches including SDA and catholic among other are among the biggest land owners but they their possession was legal. However, mushrooming evangelical churches were mentioned as having been irregularly or illegally allocated public land during the Moi regime. Many churches are built on grabbed land in Eldoret. Some respondents had the feeling that the burning of the church at Kiambaa was as a result of anger from local people who felt that the church was grabbing their land.

## **Conclusion**

Whatever the future holds for Kenya and its fructuous journey from dictatorship to democracy, underdevelopment to development, the study findings acknowledged that the 2007 PEV crisis was a complicated history rooted in the political economies of colonialism, neocolonialism, and neo-liberalism that has actually characterized Kenya over the last century. This is to suggest that at the 2007 PEV moment and the political crisis in general, is rooted in complex historical forces that go beyond 'tribalism' as it is currently being discussed even today.

This does not dismiss the role of ethnicity or particular leaders (religious and non religious), it is merely to point out the need to set this crisis both in the context of broader historical forces that have propelled Kenya to this moment and in the conditions that might impel Kenya out of it. It's true that the SDA Church responded either positively or negatively to the 2007 PEV.

As part of a society struggling to come out of a deeply traumatic experience, the church in Kenya has been left deeply wounded, disoriented and almost without voice. Fortunately, the church can learn from the experiences of churches in other countries and other ages such as Germany after the 2nd World War or South Africa after apartheid. To do so, the church must quickly move to recover its voice, restore its credibility and play its prophetic role in advancing the cause of justice, healing and reconciliation in the wake of the Kenyan crisis.

As South African theologian, Charles Villa-Vicencio reminds us in his book, (*A Theology of Social Reconstruction*, 10<sup>th</sup> May, 2008),

Unless the Church is able in these situations (of reconstruction) to translate the values of the gospel into practice and proclaim its beliefs in a language that makes sense even to those who are no longer interested in its views, it may well have no significant role at all to play in the period of reconstruction. This means that unless the church's theological values make sense to those beyond its own membership, and are given

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **6.1 Summary**

The study examined the 2007 Post election violence and the response of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Eldoret East district, Kenya. It set out to find out the causes of ethnic clashes; analyze the effects of ethnic clashes. The study was conducted in Eldoret East district, Rift Valley province in Kenya. It was descriptive in nature and employed qualitative approach. The design was the most appropriate since it was meant to describe the phenomenon.

##### **6.1.1 Description of the 2007 Post Election Violence**

Kenya has been riddled with conflict and violence throughout its brief history as a nation. The country of Kenya was ruled by the iron hands of two men in succession from 1963 to 2002: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi (1978-2002) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the ruling political party. In 1991 after much pressure from Kenyan activists and the international community multi-party elections were re-introduced. In 2002, there was a change and KANU, collapsed and a new political party comprised of an alliance that had formed between all of the major Kenyan tribes. In the 2007 general election, most Kenyans invested their faith in the electoral process. Two major parties contested during 2007 general elections. The ODM by Odinga and PNU, was for the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki. Both ODM and PNU subtly appealed to ethnic identity and ethnic prejudice. The message of change propagated by ODM made the young voters hopeful that things might just be different next time around as compared to PNU message that was rejected. After the elections and especially once the results were announced, the opposition party supporters went on an unprecedented level of 'orgy of violence' which led to counter attacks and 'revenge killings'. The violence witnessed in the wake of Kenya's 2007 general election has a

and PNU, was for the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki. Both ODM and PNU subtly appealed to ethnic identity and ethnic prejudice. The message of change propagated by ODM made the young voters hopeful that things might just be different next time around as compared to PNU message that was rejected. After the elections and especially once the results were announced, the opposition party supporters went on an unprecedented level of 'orgy of violence' which led to counter attacks and 'revenge killings'. The violence witnessed in the wake of Kenya's 2007 general election has a consistent history, namely a contest between reactionaries who insist on status quo to ensure their grip of power and revolutionaries who would stop at nothing before change engulfs Kenya.

### **6.1.2 Causes of the 2007 Post Election Violence**

In relation to the causes of ethnic violence, the study revealed that with multiparty politics, which started in 1992, selfish politicians and the political elite used the kind of diversity in multi-ethnicity to balkanize the people of Eldoret and plunge them into violence, culminating into the kind of political crisis that was witnessed in late 2007 right through to early 2008. Similarly, electoral violence in Eldoret has always developed as a result of a combination of factors, including politicization of ethnicity, colonial factors, corruption, non-adherence to the rule of law, a centralized and highly personalized form of governance, inequitable development, police failure, land scarcity, and a "winner-takes-all" form of politics perceived as benefiting one ethnic constituency to the detriment of all others. Only the 2002 and 2013 elections have not been seriously marred by violence. Other factors related to the clashes such as food insecurity, labor disruption on farms, industry and the public sector institutions, destruction of property, land grabbing, commercial disruption, breakdown in transport and communication, resource diversion, mis-allocation and unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices and environmental destruction among others.

### **6.1.3 Effects of the 2007 Post Election Violence**

Concerning the effects of 2007 post election violence it was found out that violence in Eldoret has resulted in the death of thousands of persons including women and children. During the time of this study, memories were still fresh among the locals. In Eldoret town and its surrounding regions including Nandi, Marakweti, Pokot, Mt. Kenya, Kitale among others, motor vehicles, farm products, shops, infrastructure, etc were razed down by rowdy citizens, who were crying for justice. Members from both political divides claimed that they were fighting for their rights. Most of respondents who participated in this study from non-Kalenjin communities said that most of their property was destroyed unselectively and indiscriminatively. Furthermore, many settlers who had invested especially in farming were forced to close up their industries and farms and leave. This means that many people especially the youths were left jobless without any source of livelihood. Along the same line, many farming land was left desolate for so long without cultivation. By the time of the study, the researcher saw vast land uncultivated and was used only for grazing. This land was initially planted with crops before the 2007 PEV. There was a general decline in economic production as many of the potential farmers ran away due to insecurity created by the violence.

The clashes in Eldoret East brought about a situation of gender and child vulnerability as with the case of Kiambaa church where almost all the 50 victims who were burned to death were women and children. Indeed, it is the children and women who suffered more during the period of the clashes. They were abused, violated, embarrassed and at times raped in broad daylight during the clashes. The violence led to widespread displacement. As of 27 February, Kenya Human Right Commission confirm that there were very many IDPs in organized sites, whilst a similar number of displaced were living in host communities. One of the long term economic consequences of the clashes unearthed was the fact that land ownership patterns

have been permanently altered. During the 2007 PEV, many houses were torched down and their owners were forced to leave Eldoret. There was massive exodus of non-Kalenjin communities to their ancestral homes. Many were forced to sell their land to the locals. As found out from the study, the first-hand accounts as given by respondents who experienced the clashes, victims in the affected areas were extremely disturbing as far as health was concerned.

Schools were among those that were affected as a result of the 2007 PEV since and many pupils did not re-open for the new term because of insecurity. It was also established that displacement affected learning and examination performance by mainly with overcrowding of classrooms causing a shortage in learning materials.

The 2007 PEV had also effects on the environment. Large areas of forest land were set on fire as part of a defensive strategy taken by victims of the clashes, to deny their attackers hiding grounds. This development in the long run leads to catastrophic effects on the environment of these areas. In fact, these areas are some of the densely forested zones in Kenya and some are important rain catchments areas.

On the contrary, however, the 2007 PEV provided a platform for the problems that had bedeviled the country since independence should to be addressed following the recommendations made by both the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence and the Independent Review Commission, which concentrated more on the security system, and the electoral body, among other institutions. Since the violence, Kenya has established a firm structural foundation, which was laid on a new constitutional dispensation. A strong chief executive, whose authority is derived from the constitution, was formed, the current system of power sharing was done away with and at the moment, much of the authority and severity of the country is in the hands of the people.

#### **6.1.4 Response of the Seventh Day Adventist to the 2007 Post Election Violence**

In relation to the response of the Seventh-day Adventist Church the presumption is that peace and reconciliation can only be attempted when the conflicting parties are willing. The Church can come with the message of forgiveness (Eph 4:31-32). This forgiveness has to be reciprocal.

The study discovered that the church leaders together with other actors participated in various visits to the areas affected by the violence in Eldoret East district as they did in other parts of the country. The visits were aimed at creating an environment that would enable the displaced persons to return to their homes even though they were not elaborate. It also gave the actors opportunities to receive firsthand information on the peace situation in these areas thereby enabling them to shape their initiatives appropriately.

#### **6.2 Conclusion**

In relation to study findings the following conclusion re made:

In context, whether ODM took over there would have been some kind of ethnic violence not as much as what was seen. ODM taking power would mean that the majority of the people from different ethnic background would have settled down more freely than what was seen in the violence. Attacks targeting certain ethnic groups induced revenge attacks, resulting in over two months of civil unrest throughout Kenya.

##### **6.2.1 Causes of the 2007 Post Election Violence**

In relation to the study findings the study concluded that there were a number of factors that were responsible for the 2007 PEV in Eldoret East district. Thus, the causes of 2007 post election violence included multiparty politics, selfish politicians and the political elite who used the kind of diversity in multi-ethnicity. Similarly, politicization of ethnicity, colonial

factors, corruption, non-adherence to the rule of law, a centralized and highly personalized form of governance, inequitable development, police failure, land scarcity, and a “winner-takes-all” form of politics perceived as benefiting one ethnic constituency to the detriment of all others. Other factors related to the clashes such as food insecurity, labour disruption on farms, industry and the public sector institutions, destruction of property, land grabbing, commercial disruption, breakdown in transport and communication, resource diversion, mis-allocation and unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices and environmental destruction among others.

### **6.2.2 Effects of the 2007 Post Election Violence**

The 2007 post election violence had effects such as death of thousands of persons. Furthermore, many settlers who had invested especially in farming were forced to close up their industries and farms and leave. Farming land was left desolate for so long without cultivation, resulting to decline in economic production as many of the potential farmers ran away due to insecurity created by the violence. There was also gender and child vulnerability as they were abused, violated, embarrassed and at times raped in broad daylight during the clashes. The violence led to widespread displacement. One of the long term economic consequences of the clashes unearthed was the fact that land ownership patterns have been permanently altered. Schools were among those that were affected as a result of the 2007 post election violence since many pupils did not re-open for the new term because of insecurity. The 2007 post election violence also effected the environment. Large areas of forest land were set on fire as part of a defensive strategy taken by victims of the clashes, to deny their attackers hiding grounds. However, since the 2007 post election violence, Kenya has established a firm structural foundation, which was laid on a new constitutional dispensation. A strong chief executive, whose authority is derived from the constitution, was formed, the former system of power sharing was done away with and at the moment, much of the

authority and severity of the country is in the hands of the people. There was also formation of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to address historical injustices and gross human rights abuses.

### **6.2.3 Response of Seventh Day Adventist Church to the 2007 Post Election Violence**

The Seventh-day Adventist Church has responded in different ways to the 2007 Post Election Violence. The Church responded positively by providing anti-retroviral drugs to some of the people living with HIV and AIDS who were in the IDPs and homes. Additionally, the Church addressed issues of stigma and discrimination which were rampant among the people in IDPs and those who had been displaced. Group therapy meetings were conducted for persons living with HIV and AIDS. This led to increased hope and optimism as they collectively shared and encouraged one another in their daily lives. The Churches through the local leaders showed some considerable support to several humanitarian projects by giving venues of meetings, providing overall leadership at the community level, and helping in the mobilization of the congregation to participate in the activities. This action has particularly boosted the impact of the activities carried out and the sustainability of the project. The Church became a refuge for the clash victims. Many affected persons felt safe at the Church compound even though some Churches were put on fire by organized gangs.

It can be noted that the Church rendered not only financial support, but also clothes, food stuff, psycho-social support, and spiritual support among others to the victims of 2007 PEV in Eldoret East district. The Church rushed the injured to the hospital for help. However, the Church showed considerable degree of partisanship, prejudice and tribalism by letting politicians to give hate speeches from the pulpit.

### **6.3 Recommendations**

Facilitating inter-ethnic dialogue between traditional elders, youth and women, as well as trust-building with local Administration is paramount. For example, Mt. Elgon area is now part of peace consultations aimed at developing a 3-year peace building/conflict prevention strategy, where elders have been used to facilitate the program. The study recommended the same to be done in Eldoret East district in relation to promoting peace and co-existence. On this same note, the study recommended the training of elders to be carried out in other areas too. Such efforts in other places were recommended in order to bring about the spirit of reconciliation among various communities in the Rift Valley and Kenya as a nation.

In view of the findings, the study recommended that the education sector be more enlightened on the effects of displacement of persons due to violence on education and academic performance in order to elicit faster response and curb the negative effects of violence on learning. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education should put in place more personalized counseling for pupils traumatized through violence and death of family members so that healing takes place faster and facilitating better learning experience.

The study also recommended the setting up of emergency units by the government so as to provide faster financial assistance to violence victims. Additionally, the study recommended that parents and care givers be given skills that will enable them run and sustain their businesses so as to reduce the poverty level and be able to support their children's education better.

In relation to religious integration, the study recommended that leaders need to take a bold step in appreciating and understanding the critical role they have played, both negative and positive in the history of democratization in Kenya, and then develop a way forward in its



community and thereby become a model to the rest of society of what can be accomplished if people live together in harmony.

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