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dc.contributor.authorGeorge, Kizito M
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-03T07:39:55Z
dc.date.available2024-07-03T07:39:55Z
dc.date.issued2024-06-20
dc.identifier.citationKizito, M. G. (2024). From Legal Positivism to Neo-Liberal Scientism: A Metaphysical Defence of Moral Law and the Inseparability Thesis. Jumuga Journal of Education, Oral Studies, and Human Sciences (JJEOSHS), 7(1), 1-15.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.35544/jjeoshs.v7i1.69
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12504/1940
dc.description.abstractDespite decades of contentions between moral legalists and legal positivists about the place of morality in law, moral law has vehemently stood out as the end of history. The scientific experiment has despondently failed to logically evict the moral law from the jurisprudential discourse. This research article posits that moral law is the End of History as far jurisprudential evolution is concerned. It argues that the mechanization of law through the positivistic experiment is a moral debacle dented with logical inconsistencies and insurmountable fallacies. It thus uses the inseparability thesis to demonstrate the pivotality of moral law in every positive jurisprudence superstructure. It contends that law appeals to our moral sensibilities because it pre-supposes a conscience in the law giver, the law enforcer and the citizen who is supposed to abide by the law. This Ought necessity therefore makes the trio morally credible to legislate, enforce the law and be legally bound by the principles and precincts established by the law.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherJumuga Journal of Education, Oral Studies, and Human Sciences (JJEOSHS)en_US
dc.subjectInseparability thesisen_US
dc.subjectLegal positivismen_US
dc.subjectMetaphysicsen_US
dc.subjectMoral Lawen_US
dc.subjectNeo-liberalismen_US
dc.titleFrom Legal Positivism to Neo-Liberal Scientism: A Metaphysical Defence of Moral Law and the Inseparability Thesisen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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